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CONTRACTUAL STAKEHOLDERISM
KISHANTHI PARELLA*

ABSTRACT
In 2019, the Business Roundtable announced its commitment to all corporate
stakeholders—consumers, employees, suppliers, and communities—and not just
shareholders. This announcement has reawakened an old debate over corporate
social responsibility. Stakeholderism advocates argue that corporate leaders
must consider the interests of the various stakeholders impacted by corporate
decision-making. Stakeholderism critics challenge this view, expressing
concerns that stakeholderism will magnify managerial agency costs, chill
regulation, risk inauthenticity, and lead to impractical solutions.
This Article proposes “contractual stakeholderism” to operationalize
stakeholderism in accordance with the views of its advocates but in a way that
is attentive to the concerns of its critics. Normatively, it advocates for a shift
from a benefits-based approach to stakeholderism to one focused on harms
prevention. The former often justifies stakeholderism by highlighting benefits
that stakeholder protection can offer the corporation, including advancing
shareholder value. But this basis for stakeholderism will fall short because what
is good for the stakeholder is not always good for the shareholder; instead,
sometimes their interests conflict. In these situations, the benefits-based
approach will inevitably lead to the prioritization of the shareholder over the
stakeholder. To address this shortcoming, this Article advocates for a harmsbased approach that focuses on the risks that a corporation’s activities create
for stakeholders. This approach applies to a wider range of corporate activity
and protects a broader range of stakeholders than does the benefits-based
approach. This Article justifies the normative shift to a harms-based approach
by identifying five dimensions of inequality that place stakeholders at unique
risk of harm from corporate conduct: notice, choice, risk management, legal
remedies, and the fruits of exchange. Practically, this Article explains that many
stakeholder harms arise from the contracting choices that corporate actors
negotiate, draft, and bind their companies to perform. A harms-based approach
*
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would require corporate actors to design these contracts differently to mitigate
or eliminate risks to stakeholders. To incentivize such contract design, this
Article concludes by proposing the following tort duty: Corporations, as
contracting parties, must take into account stakeholders’ interests when
performance of the contract creates a risk of harm to them.
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INTRODUCTION
When corporations act in the world, the consequences of their actions do not
fall only on the corporate leaders who made the decision or the shareholders
whose investments may consequently rise or fall. Instead, corporate activity has
a long reach, casting a shadow over a corporation’s many stakeholders, such as
employees, consumers, communities, suppliers, and more. The question is:
Whose interests should a corporation serve?
We are witnessing a potential shift from “shareholder capitalism”—which
prioritizes the interests of a corporation’s shareholders—to “stakeholder
capitalism,” which addresses the interests of a broader segment of society,
including consumers, employees, and local communities.1
Many have advocated for such a shift, both historically and recently. To begin
2019, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, warned that pursuit of profits is not a
substitute for corporate purpose and that “society is increasingly looking to
companies, both public and private, to address pressing social and economic
issues.”2 The same year, the Business Roundtable—an association of CEOs of
major U.S. businesses3—created waves when it announced a new statement on
corporate purpose, which recognized that “[e]ach of our stakeholders is
essential” and which committed to “[d]elivering value to our customers,”
“[i]nvesting in our employees,” “[d]ealing fairly and ethically with our
suppliers,” “[s]upporting the communities in which we work,” and “[g]enerating
long-term value for shareholders.”4 The CEOs of nearly 200 of America’s
largest companies signed the statement;5 its current signatories include 3M,
Salesforce, Raytheon, Pfizer, Lockheed Martin, Morgan Stanley, IBM, Home

1

See Klaus Schwab & Peter Vanham, What Is the Difference Between Stakeholder
Capitalism, Shareholder Capitalism and State Capitalism?, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/01/what-is-the-difference-between-stakeholdercapitalism-shareholder-capitalism-and-state-capitalism-davos-agenda-2021/
[https://perma.cc/3SHL-ZZ7T].
2
Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & CEO, BlackRock, to CEOs (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/en/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/F26M-A7SA] (“Purpose unifies management, employees, and
communities. It drives ethical behavior and creates an essential check on actions that go
against the best interests of stakeholders.”).
3
About Us, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/T5XP-TGMP] (last visited Mar. 16, 2022).
4
BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION 1 (2021),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BRT-StatementonthePurposeofaCorporationJuly2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7C9N-WLJP].
5
Press Release, Bus. Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a
Corporation to Promote ‘an Economy That Serves All Americans’ (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/6AUGRSGZ].
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Depot, Coca-Cola, and Ford.6 Following the statement’s release, the World
Economic Forum issued its Davos Manifesto 2020, which began by recognizing
the following: “The purpose of a company is to engage all its stakeholders in
shared and sustained value creation. In creating such value, a company serves
not only its shareholders, but all its stakeholders – employees, customers,
suppliers, local communities and society at large.”7
Despite this support, the Business Roundtable’s statement has restarted an old
debate regarding the purpose of the corporation and the worth of its stakeholders.
While this is an old and familiar battleground,8 this Article focuses on the recent
debate that has coincided with or followed the Business Roundtable’s statement.
Those advocating for stakeholderism argue that “[t]he purpose of business is
to profitably solve the problems of people and planet, and not profit from causing
problems.”9 But defining corporate purpose is not enough: “[A] purposeful
business will also ensure that measures are in place to ensure accountability
within the business for remaining faithful to its purpose and for ongoing
monitoring and reporting of delivery of the purpose.”10
6

BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 4, at 2-15 (listing signatories); see also Letter from
Andrew Ninian, Dir. of Stewardship & Corp. Governance, The Inv. Ass’n, to Chair, FTSE
350,
at
1
(Apr.
7,
2020),
https://www.theia.org/sites/default/files/202004/Letter%20to%20FTSE%20Chairs%20-%20April%202020_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/42W6-LJAY] (“[W]e favour companies that can demonstrate they are well
run and take a long-term view of how they treat their employees, communities, suppliers,
pension savers and customers.”).
7
Klaus Schwab, Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the
Fourth
Industrial
Revolution,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
(Dec.
2,
2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-ofa-company-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/XCC4-7MVU].
8
See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 33; Capitalisn’t, Shareholders
vs.
Stakeholders,
CHI.
BOOTH
REV.,
at
00:59
(Aug.
29,
2019),
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/capitalisnt-shareholders-vs-stakeholders
[https://perma.cc/9UNR-QJZE] (“[W]e’re going to dispel the notion that this
stakeholder/shareholder primacy debate is something that’s just bubbling up now or
something that bubbled up in the 1970s. In fact, it has a much longer history than that.”).
9
BRIT. ACAD., PRINCIPLES FOR PURPOSEFUL BUSINESS 16 (2019).
10
Id. at 17; see also, e.g., MARTIN LIPTON, STEVEN A. ROSENBLUM, SABASTIAN V. NILES,
SARA J. LEWIS & KISHO WATANABE, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ; MICHAEL DREXLER,
WORLD ECON. F., THE NEW PARADIGM: A ROADMAP FOR AN IMPLICIT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS TO ACHIEVE
SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 1 (2016) (“[T]he New Paradigm
recalibrates the relationship between public corporations and their major institutional
investors and conceives of corporate governance as a collaboration among corporations,
shareholders and other stakeholders working together to achieve long-term value and resist
short-termism.”); Martin Lipton, Directors Have a Duty to Look Beyond Their Shareholders,
FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 18, 2019, at 11 [hereinafter Lipton, Directors’ Duty] (arguing that
to mitigate societal costs of corporate activity, “directors have the ability, and in many
instances the obligation, to use their reasoned business judgment to balance the interests of
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Others are more critical of stakeholderism and challenge it on at least four
separate grounds: managerial agency costs, regulatory consequences,
inauthentic commitments, and impractical solutions, among others. Some fear
that stakeholderism may magnify the problem at the core of corporate
governance: managing agency costs.11 Shareholders already struggle with
ensuring that corporate leaders act in the shareholders’ interest.12
Stakeholderism may grant corporate leaders even greater discretion so that
“directors’ and officers’ accountability would become rather problematic.”13
Another fear is that stakeholderism may chill meaningful regulation of
corporations.14 This second fear is based on the particular moment in which we
find ourselves: skepticism of corporations is great and demand for regulation is

all stakeholders”); Martin Lipton, Purpose, Stakeholders, ESG and Sustainable Long-Term
Investment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 24, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/24/purpose-stakeholders-esg-and-sustainable-longterm-investment/ [https://perma.cc/JYZ2-Z7LL] (outlining key stakeholder governance
advice for corporate officers and boards).
11
See, e.g., Matteo Gatti & Chrystin Ondersma, Can a Broader Corporate Purpose
Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder Approach Chimera, 46 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2020) (“Without
specific mandates to corporations and without enforcement mechanisms, these measures do
little more than increase managerial discretion.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita,
The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 165 (2020)
(“[S]upport for stakeholderism may well be strategic: an attempt to advance a managerialist
agenda dressed in stakeholder clothing to make it more appealing to the general public . . . .”);
Dorothy S. Lund, Corporate Finance for Social Good, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1636 (2021)
(“[I]t is possible that some management teams would use their enhanced discretion to waste
money or maximize their private benefits, leading to economic harm—if not now, then at
some time in the future.”).
12
See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 118-19 (2006) (“Because of
the flaws in shareholder voting and market discipline as accountability mechanisms, the
shareholder lawsuit represents the only forum corporate law provides through which directors
could be held to account for poor decisions or oversight failures. Unfortunately, the ‘no
liability’ rule has stripped the shareholder suit of this potential power. The business judgment
rule, the special litigation committee, and the demand requirement all work to spare directors
of the need to justify their actions.” (footnotes omitted)); Jessica Erickson, The Gatekeepers
of Shareholder Litigation, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 237, 237-38 (2017) (explaining that
“[s]hareholder litigation is a key tool in controlling . . . agency costs” but that it is also
vulnerable to its own agency cost challenges because “[m]ost shareholder plaintiffs lack
sufficient incentives to closely monitor the[] lawsuits” so that “plaintiffs’ attorneys can make
litigation decisions that benefit themselves at the expense of their shareholder clients”).
13
Gatti & Ondersma, supra note 11, at 20.
14
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 11, at 171-73 (“Given that the adoption of
law, regulations, and policies is the main avenue through which corporate externalities on
stakeholders can be effectively addressed, it is important to consider the potential effect of
embracing stakeholderism on the prospects of such reforms. . . . [E]mbracing stakeholderism
should be expected to impede such reforms.”); Capitalisn’t, supra note 8, at 31:21 (“I think
that [the Business Roundtable statement] was meant to distort regulation or prevent regulation
that would better align the objectives of corporations with the community at large.”).
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high.15 A poor corporate track record on climate change, data security, executive
compensation, workers’ rights, and consumers’ rights has fueled public support
for greater regulation of corporate activity.16 Stakeholderism critics fear that
corporate leaders may use stakeholderism to reestablish their legitimacy and
prevent regulation.17

15
See Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to
Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2018, at A17 (discussing proposed “Accountable
Capitalism Act,” which would have required “corporate directors to consider the interests of
all major corporate stakeholders—not only shareholders—in company decisions”). Senator
Warren has not reintroduced the Accountable Capitalism Act in the 117th Congress. See
Legislation Sponsored or Cosponsored by Elizabeth Warren, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/member/elizabeth-warren/W000817? (last visited Mar. 16, 2022).
16
For example, the Indian government adopted stakeholder-oriented legislation to
encourage corporations to deliver public goods. Section 135 of the 2013 Indian Companies
Act requires that “the board of directors . . . form a [corporate social responsibility (“CSR”)]
committee of the board, with at least one independent director to formulate and monitor the
company’s CSR agenda, policy and practices.” Afra Afsharipour, Lessons from India’s
Struggles with Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND
PERSONHOOD 363, 372 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2021). The Act also
contains a “2 percent spending provision, which requires that large firms meeting specific size
or profit thresholds spend at least 2 percent of their net profit on CSR.” Id. One scholar notes
that “much of the CSR spending has been focused on issues of high need for India’s nationbuilding development such as education, health, and sanitation.” Id. at 375. Additionally, “the
Indian government has . . . enacted a stakeholder-oriented approach to board fiduciary duties
and mandated sustainability disclosure for India’s largest companies.” Id. at 379.
17
LIPTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 2 (“In a broader context, we hope that the New Paradigm
will . . . through voluntary cooperation by corporations and institutional investors, obviate the
need for regulation and legislation to enforce a longer-term approach.”); id. at 7 (“The New
Paradigm does not require new legislation or regulation and relies instead on the initiatives,
commitments and follow-through of corporations and investors.”); Lipton, Directors’ Duty,
supra note 10, at 11 (“This solution would be far less intrusive than proposals by presidential
candidate Elizabeth Warren to put worker representatives on boards.”); id. (“We do not need
new laws or court decisions allowing well-informed directors to take all stakeholders into
account.”); Gatti & Ondersma, supra note 11, at 10 (“[E]xecutives can deploy stakeholderism
defensively—by accepting a nominal change they preempt direct regulation that could truly
shift power and resources to weaker constituents.”); see also Afsharipour, supra note 16, at
367 (“The Indian approach to CSR provides an environment where corporations can use their
CSR efforts and corporate purpose rhetoric to curry political favor with the state, while the
state can use CSR and sustainability rhetoric to politically signal that it values society, even
in the face of rising inequality and persistent poverty.”); Capitalisn’t, supra note 8, at 17:16
(“[Billionaire investor Seth] Klarman is saying managers, in excessively being concerned
about only shareholders, were actually hurting shareholders because they opened themselves
up to too much regulation. And so, in order to better benefit shareholders, they have to pretend,
or at least appear, that they are not going to be acting in the interest of shareholders.”).

872

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:865

A third fear is that corporate statements favoring stakeholderism are
inauthentic18 because, for instance, these statements are vague,19 many CEOs
signed on to the Business Roundtable statement without board approval,20
director and CEO incentives continue to privilege shareholder welfare,21 and the
stakeholder debate can perpetuate marginalization instead of addressing it.22
Concerns over inauthenticity are supported by an empirical study that found that
“[original] signatories of the [Business Roundtable] statement have higher rates
of environmental and labor-related compliance violations . . . despite
the . . . statement’s specific reference to employees and the environment”23 and
that they “are more likely to pay out labor lawsuit settlements.”24 Another study
found that corporate leaders frequently failed to negotiate and include
protections for stakeholder groups in acquisition deals with private equity
buyers, even in states with stakeholder-friendly constituency statutes.25 Finally,
if stakeholderism is authentic, then critics argue that it is impractical,26 forcing

18
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 11, at 108-10 (terming this “instrumental
stakeholderism” and arguing that “enlightened shareholder value” version of stakeholderism
is conceptual equivalent of traditional shareholder value principles).
19
See, e.g., id. at 127 (criticizing vagueness of Business Roundtable statement); Jill E.
Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose? 99 TEX. L. REV.
1309, 1337-39 (2021) (arguing that corporate purpose statements have limited value because
“[n]ot only is it unclear what these commitments mean, but it is almost impossible to
determine whether they are being met”).
20
Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 11, at 130-33.
21
See id. at 141 (“The most conspicuous aspect to notice is that, while director
compensation practices are designed to align the interests of directors with shareholder
interests, they produce no alignment of director interests with the interests of stakeholders.”).
22
See Veronica Root Martinez, A More Equitable Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD, supra note 16, at 47, 59 (“[T]he
original arguments about the importance of stakeholders were not arguments rooted in
achieving greater racial and gender equality—it appears that they might still have been
arguments about how white men should sort out the balance of power amongst them.”).
23
Aneesh Raghunandan & Shiva Rajgopal, Do Socially Responsible Firms Walk the Talk?
2 (Apr. 1, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3609056).
24
Id. at 16.
25
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders
Bargain, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1476 (2021) (finding that corporate leaders rarely
negotiated for post-deal protections for variety of stakeholders, including employees,
creditors, consumers, suppliers, local communities, and environment).
26
Bebchuk and Tallarita raise this concern through what they term “pluralistic
stakeholderism.” See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 11, at 114-15 (“[P]luralistic
stakeholderism relies on directors to make the hard choices necessary to define the groups of
stakeholders whose interests should be taken into account and then to weigh and balance these
interests, which are often difficult to measure, in the vast number of situations in which tradeoffs arise.”); see also Gatti & Ondersma, supra note 11, at 19-20 (noting director confusion
regarding stakeholder interest prioritization as “recurring critique” of stakeholderism).
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corporate directors to engage in impossible trade-offs to balance competing
stakeholder interests.27
As a result of this debate over stakeholderism, some scholars have attempted
to reconcile the differences by arguing that corporate leaders should consider

27

See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 11, at 119-23; The Perils of Stakeholderism,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 2020, at 65, 65 (“[A]mid increasingly polarised politics, what is good
for one set of stakeholders may be anathema to another.”). But see Colin Mayer,
Shareholderism Versus Stakeholderism – A Misconceived Contradiction. A Comment on “The
Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance” by Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita 5
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 522/2020, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3617847 (“The weight that is attached
to different impacts is determined by the values that are ascribed to them, not simply their
financial value. By seeking to translate everything into monetary terms, a shareholder
perspective does not, as is often claimed, simplify management by promoting just one
objective instead of many, but complicates it by requiring the incommensurable to be made
commensurable.”).
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stakeholder interests as part of their fiduciary duties.28 Others have proposed
reforms that could help incentivize corporate leaders to protect stakeholders.29

28
See, e.g., Lund, supra note 11, at 1626 (“There is a growing consensus that corporations
could make public-interested decisions if they wanted to: Legal scholars defend a view of
fiduciary obligation that would allow directors and officers to make public-interested choices,
even those that sacrifice corporate profits.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S.
Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an
Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1885,
1889 (2021) (“By engaging in a thoughtful updating and integration of existing regulatory
reporting and compliance and [environment, employee, social, and governance (“EESG”)]
processes, corporate leaders can efficiently generate robust information about their EESG
performance and legal compliance to share with stakeholders and simultaneously fulfill their
duty to monitor the corporate enterprise.”); Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate
Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1459 (2020) (“[C]ourts should recognize
[environment, social, and governance (“ESG”) considerations] as an essential part of boards’
monitoring mission.”); Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO.
L.J. 819 passim (2017) (arguing that employers owe fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary duties to
employees); Kent Greenfield, The Third Way, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2014)
(arguing that it would violate fiduciary duties “to prioritize one stakeholder over others
consistently and persistently or to fail to consider the interests of all stakeholders in significant
corporate decisions”); Andrew Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost: The Real Meaning of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 221, 236 (2011) (“[D]irectors’ duty to
act in good faith . . . should be reformed to require the directors to take action that is capable
of producing returns for the shareholders while internalising the externalities of which they
become aware in the course of management.”); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1991) (proposing “stakeholder model of corporate
social responsibility” that “expands directorial fiduciary duties to encompass actions that
shield workers from disruptions brought about by plant closings and other corporate
changes”). But see Gatti & Ondersma, supra note 11, at 9 (“[A]ll existing proposals to broaden
the scope of fiduciary duties to cover weaker constituencies are absolutely vague on the actual
measures or initiatives the board should undertake to benefit such constituencies.”). Some
scholars also point out that shareholders are often the parties who advance stakeholderoriented objectives. See, e.g., Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven
Stakeholderism, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu
/2020/04/15/shareholder-driven-stakeholderism-hwang-nili/
[https://perma.cc/4HFMNXH5] (“[I]t seems that shareholders play an enormous role in influencing companies to
adopt the ESG-related policies that are often aligned with stakeholder theory.”). See generally
HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2020 (2020) (identifying
hundreds of shareholder resolutions addressing topics as varied as human rights, climate
change, gun control, board diversity, and corporate governance).
29
See Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality Metrics, YALE L.J.F.
869, 875-76 (2021) (proposing that institutional investors should pressure corporations to
adopt “equality metrics,” which are “systematized corporate disclosure[s] of the current
demographic diversity of the workforce and supply chain, as well as measurable, specific
plans to improve racial equity” and that “firms should (i) measure the state of (in)equality in
their organizations and supply chains; (ii) identify a list of specific, assessable equality goals;
(iii) implement policies and procedures aimed at achieving those goals that can be tested and
measured; (iv) disclose their progress toward meeting these goals at regular intervals; and
(v) use their own and others’ measured performances on these metrics to direct their future
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This Article offers its own proposal for operationalizing stakeholderism in a
way that is attentive to many well-founded concerns of its critics. Normatively,
this Article proposes shifting the normative foundation of stakeholderism from
receipt of benefits to prevention of harms. Many arguments in favor of
stakeholderism rest upon a benefits-based approach encompassing a diversity of
views on the benefits—to a corporation, specifically, or society, generally—that
result from stakeholder protection. The appeal of a benefits-based approach is
obvious. For example, some proponents of the “business case” for
stakeholderism explain how protecting the interests of nonshareholders can
increase company value.30 Others favor transparency laws that improve access
to information on environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) practices for
both stakeholder and shareholder audiences because informed stakeholders can
help sanction corporate actors for undesirable conduct, thereby helping to align
corporate practices with societal expectations.31 While these views are certainly
not substitutes for each other, they share a common expectation that stakeholdercentric reforms will ultimately bring about certain important benefits—to
shareholders, society, or both. The value of these approaches is that they
illuminate how stakeholder protection advances objectives for other
efforts at creating a more equitable organization”). But see Gatti & Ondersma, supra note 11,
at 70 (“[T]he reasons that employees, consumers, and other weaker constituents have lost
power and resources do not likely stem from any corporate governance changes, but rather
from problems such as increased market concentration, weakening of labor market
institutions, and regressive taxation.”). See generally Lund, supra note 11 (discussing creation
of “CSR bonds” that can financially incentivize corporate leaders to take on prosocial but
profit-sacrificing projects); Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals,
106 VA. L. REV. 937 (2020) (proposing new “social enterprise” legal form as commitment
device to attract capital and income from investors and consumers).
30
See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 19, at 1330 (“If corporate officials are charged with
maximizing shareholder value, and the consideration of stakeholder interests enhances
shareholder value, then properly informed corporate officials will do so regardless of whether
the corporate purpose statement identifies the consideration of such interests as a distinct
obligation, and their broad discretion to do so will be protected by the business judgment rule.
Indeed, if consideration of stakeholder interests is necessary to maximize shareholder value,
corporate officials would be remiss for failing to afford sufficient consideration to those
interests.” (footnotes omitted)); Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate
Governance Machine, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2563, 2566 (2021) (“Today many companies
pursue ESG goals, and many investors favor ESG funds, not for moral reasons or a prosocial
willingness to sacrifice profits, but because ESG is thought to provide sustainable long-term
value or higher risk-adjusted returns for shareholders. This reframing has in turn shaped
managerial decisionmaking about the kinds of ESG activity in which corporations should
engage.” (footnote omitted)).
31
Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder
Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 499, 561-62 (2020); see also Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate
Social Responsibility, ESG, and Compliance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE
662, 668-69 (Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2021) (describing various forms
of external meta-regulation); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1012, 1013-14 (2013) (describing shift in corporate governance from “private ordering” to
“public governance”).
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constituencies, including shareholders. The challenge is that these groups’
interests do not always converge.32 Instead, sometimes what is good for a
stakeholder may be bad for shareholders—or even other stakeholders. It is
important to recognize when a benefits-based approach may fall short. In
contrast, a harms-based approach does not depend on the benefits that
stakeholder protection brings to a corporation or society but on the risks that
unconsenting stakeholders face in the absence of protection.33 This distinction is
important because the harms-based approach may protect stakeholders that a
benefits-based approach would not.
Practically, this Article emphasizes the hard fact that many stakeholder harms
arise from contracts—namely, the contracting choices that corporate actors
negotiate, draft, and bind their companies to perform.34 We already recognize
the ways stakeholders may be harmed directly by the contracts they enter into

32
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-24 (1980) (developing theory of “interest convergence”
and applying it to racial equality: “The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites. . . . Racial remedies may
instead be the outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious judicial
conclusions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal
interests deemed important by middle and upper class whites. Racial justice — or its
appearance — may, from time to time, be counted among the interests deemed important by
the courts and by society’s policymakers”); id. at 524 (“I contend that the decision in Brown
to break with the Court’s long-held position on these issues cannot be understood without
some consideration of the decision’s value to whites, not simply those concerned about the
immorality of racial inequality, but also those whites in policymaking positions able to see
the economic and political advances at home and abroad that would follow abandonment of
segregation.”). This analysis is applicable to the ESG debate regarding the priorities of
shareholders and stakeholders. See, e.g., Lund & Pollman, supra note 30, at 2614
(“[A]lthough the move to value-enhancing ESG arguably narrowed the range of publicminded activities that companies might pursue, CSR advocates may have been willing to
accept the ESG movement, as previous efforts to change corporate behavior had made limited
inroads. In other words, in a world anchored to shareholder primacy, advocates of CSR may
have realized that many lawmakers and legal advisors would only support reform that was
framed as value-maximizing ESG.”).
33
See, e.g., BRIT. ACAD., supra note 9, at 16 (explaining that corporate purpose statement
“identifies how companies assist people, organisations, societies and nations to address the
challenges they face, while at the same time helping companies to avoid or minimise the
problems they might cause”).
34
For a discussion of the effects of contract performance on third parties, see generally
Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REGUL. 211 (2015); David A.
Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 198-203 (2019);
David A. Hoffman & Cathy Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 979
(2021); and Andrew Johnston, Governing Externalities: The Potential of Reflexive Corporate
Social Responsibility (Univ. of Cambridge Ctr. for Bus. Rsch., Working Paper No. 436, 2012).
For a discussion of the negative externalities that private social impact investing imposes on
targeted communities due to limited community participation, see generally Cary Martin
Shelby, Profiting from Our Pain: Privileged Access to Social Impact Investing, 109 CALIF. L.
REV. 1261, 1265-66, 1285-86 (2021).
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with corporations. This awareness has raised concerns over contracting practices
and bargaining power, information asymmetries, and informed consent. In
contrast, this Article focuses on contracts to which stakeholders are not parties
but third parties. Even if they are not signatories, contracts can still injure these
stakeholders as third parties in myriad ways. For example, a supply contract
between an American retailer and an overseas garment manufacturer can impose
costs on two types of stakeholders: (a) employees of the American retailer who
may face the risk of layoffs and (b) employees of the overseas supplier who may
face enhanced labor risks as a result of the contract’s terms. These stakeholders
are placed at risk because of the terms of the contract between the retailer and
the supplier. Third parties’ vulnerability also raises a distinct set of concerns
regarding contracting from those raised when they are contract signatories.
Specifically, it alerts us to five dimensions of inequality that place stakeholders
at unique risk of harm from corporate conduct: notice, choice, risk management,
legal remedies, and the fruits of exchange. Only by changing contracting
practices do corporations protect stakeholders in a meaningful way.
The problem is incentives. As third parties, stakeholders are not at the
bargaining table when contract terms are negotiated and drafted. Those at the
negotiating table—in this case, corporate leaders—encounter little incentive to
consider interests beyond shareholders’ or their own.35 As a result, contracts
often neglect the interests of a range of stakeholders who are at risk of harm once
the contract is performed.36 To supply the missing incentive, this Article
proposes the following tort duty: Corporations, as contracting parties, must take
into account stakeholders’ interests when performance of the contract creates a
risk of harm to them.37
This duty derives from the reality that parties sometimes design contracts
negligently. While we frequently keep tort law and contract law distinct, we
should recognize how the former imposes limits on the latter. We should expect
contract parties to exercise reasonable care in contract design when the
anticipated performance creates a risk of harm to those absent from the
bargaining table: third parties. This obligation does not arise from the contract
itself but from tort law, which commands us all to consider the harmful effects
of our conduct on others. Contracting is conduct, independent of the acts that it
binds the parties to perform. Negligence law thus circumscribes the “freedom of
contract” that the contract parties enjoy.
A contractual duty to account for stakeholder interests would apply to all
contracting parties—not just corporate actors. However, given the severity of
35
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 25, at 1525-27 (noting incentives created by shareholder
legal rights, executive compensation, and markets for labor and control).
36
Id. at 1524-25.
37
In previous work, I advocate for a similar duty to address human rights abuses in supply
chains. Kishanthi Parella, Protecting Third Parties in Contracts, 58 AM. BUS. L.J. 327, 33637 (2021). In this Article, I pursue two different objectives: (a) a general framework for how
this duty can protect stakeholders in a variety of contracts, not just supply contracts, and (b) a
harms-based normative foundation for this duty.
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impact, diversity of stakeholders, and scale of operations, this Article focuses on
contracting choices of corporations as an illustration of the broader contractual
duty to third parties. This examination is particularly significant in the context
of the debate over corporate purpose because it demonstrates a way to address
some of corporations’ negative stakeholder impacts. By applying a tort duty to
contract design, corporate actors must be mindful of the risks that their contracts
create for nonsignatories to the contract. Specifically, they must account for their
contract’s negative externalities, which “occur[] where a decision is taken that
results in an event which has adverse, uncompensated effects on another party
who does not consent to it.”38 This analysis is especially significant where
applicable regulations do not sufficiently address the negative externalities that
the contracts create for corporate stakeholders. It may be less relevant when
parties conform their transactions to regulations that address many of the
pressing externalities that stakeholders confront.39 For that reason, this Article
applies its analysis to two contexts—data privacy and global supply chains—
that illustrate the severe externalities created by corporate conduct that remain
inadequately addressed by current regulation.
Collectively, these proposed normative and practical changes offer a
“contractual stakeholderism” approach that addresses many concerns of both
camps of the stakeholder debate. It addresses the concerns of stakeholderism
advocates by proposing a contractual solution for those stakeholder harms that
originate within contract design. Through a duty to contract, this proposal
creates an incentive to protect stakeholders that is otherwise absent. It also
addresses two fears of the critics discussed above: inauthenticity and
impracticality. It addresses inauthenticity by making a corporation’s
commitment to stakeholderism observable and verifiable; if corporate leaders
mean what they say, then we should see that commitment demonstrated in the
contracts that they write. It addresses impracticality by identifying whose
interests count and which interests to privilege, as well as what action is
needed—contract design. While not eliminating the burden of balancing
interests, the proposed duty relieves much of this burden by providing greater
clarity as to what stakeholderism requires of corporate leaders.

38
Johnston, supra note 34, at 1; see also id. (“Prima facie, this is a market failure because
it results in an inefficient allocation of resources: those who gain the benefits of the activity
do not bear all the costs. A portion of the costs are transferred onto other economic agents.”).
39
See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 238 (2010) (“On
the surface, a typical business deal has only two parties: the buyer and the seller. But
conceptually there are three parties, not two, at the negotiating table: the buyer, the seller, and
the government—typically acting through statutes and regulations written in advance of the
deal. The government imposes regulatory costs on transactions in the form of taxes, securitieslaw disclosure requirements, antitrust constraints, environmental-compliance obligations, and
so on.”). However, despite these regulations, parties can still engage in “regulatory arbitrage”
as “a perfectly legal planning technique used to avoid taxes, accounting rules, securities
disclosure, and other regulatory costs.” Id. at 229.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how many stakeholderoriented views justify stakeholder protection based on the benefits that such
protection brings to the corporation. Part I also demonstrates the limitations of a
benefits-based approach by introducing a taxonomy that classifies “corporatestakeholder” interactions based on whether their interests converge, diverge, or
conflict. Part II argues in favor of abandoning a benefits basis for stakeholder
protection in favor of a normative foundation of harm prevention: corporate
actors should protect stakeholders not because it benefits them to do so but
because stakeholders will be harmed absent that protection. Part III proposes a
duty to contract that can help operationalize the harms-based approach by
requiring that corporate actors design contracts to minimize or eliminate risks to
stakeholders that would otherwise result from contract performance. This Part
provides concrete suggestions for contract design by applying the duty to
contract to two illustrative examples involving data security and labor violations
in supply chains. Part IV explains how this Article’s proposal for “contractual
stakeholderism” fulfills the aims of stakeholderism’s advocates while
simultaneously addressing the concerns of its critics. Finally, Part V addresses
two potential objections to the normative and practical suggestions offered in
this Article: (a) the limits of contract design to protect stakeholders and (b) the
alternative option of public regulation to protect stakeholders.
I.

THE LIMITS OF THE BENEFITS-BASED APPROACH TO STAKEHOLDERISM

The justifications for stakeholder protection are important because they can
determine the scope, strength, and beneficiaries of that protection. As discussed
in this Part, many justifications rest upon a “business case” for stakeholder
protection that emphasizes the business benefits that corporations gain from
providing such protection. Unfortunately, this type of justification will
insufficiently protect stakeholders from corporate harm. Section I.A provides a
brief introduction to the stakeholder concept, while Section I.B examines several
different strands of benefits-based approaches to stakeholder protection,
beginning with the business case. Section I.C explains the limitations of the
benefits approach by providing a taxonomy of interests between stakeholders
and shareholders: convergence, stalemate, and conflict. The benefits approach
may protect stakeholders when their interests converge with those of
shareholders; it is less effective when their interests do not. Finally, Section I.D
applies the benefits approach to two illustrative examples to demonstrate its
limitations.
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What Does It Mean to Protect Corporate Stakeholders?

A corporation’s stakeholder is “[a]ny group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives.”40 Examples of such
stakeholder groups include: owners, consumer advocates, customers,
competitors, media, employees, suppliers, environmentalists, governments, and
local community organizations.41 According to business scholar R. Edward
Freeman, these are all stakeholders of a corporation because “[e]ach of these
groups plays a vital role in the success of the business enterprise in today’s
environment”42 and “[e]ach . . . has a stake in the modern corporation.”43
Shareholders provide financial capital; employees provide human capital;
consumers provide revenue; suppliers provide raw materials, intermediate
goods, and finished products (and human capital); governments provide a
regulatory framework; and local communities provide the “social license to
operate,” to name a few.
Given their ability to affect the success of a corporation, one may expect that
corporate managers would protect the interests of these stakeholders. Michael
Porter and Mark Kramer advocate for “shared value,” which refers to the
“policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company
while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the
communities in which it operates.”44 Shared value is based on a belief in the
interdependence of the well-being of the business organization and the broader
environment in which it operates.45
If stakeholders matter, then what steps would we expect corporations to take
to protect their interests? Let’s consider two examples involving corporate
stakeholders. In Hypothetical 1, a social media company allows its users to post
pictures, videos, and other types of media through an app, which collects
additional information such as users’ locations, facial recognition data, and
online browsing and purchasing practices. The social media company can, and
does, sell that information to a number of other companies at considerable
profit.46 The app’s users are stakeholders of the social media company because
40
R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 25
exhibit 1.5 (Edwin M. Epstein ed., 1984).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 25.
43
Id.
44
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent
Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb.
2011, at 62, 66.
45
Id.; see also JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 2 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003)
(1978) (arguing that “organizations survive to the extent that they are effective” and
“effectiveness derives from the management of demands, particularly the demands of interest
groups upon which the organizations depend for resources and support”).
46
For example, in Goldenshores Technologies, the FTC had brought a complaint against
the developer of a free flashlight app alleging that “the company’s privacy policy deceptively
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they are the ones posting photos and uploading other information about
themselves. If they desisted from these activities, the app would fail and,
consequently, so would the social media company. Company policies and
conduct also impact them, such as the company’s decision to sell their personal
information to another business.47 To protect stakeholders, we would expect the
social media company to protect the data security of app users by disclosing to
users, at registration and routinely after that, all the types of information that the
app may collect and the company’s planned uses of it, including the possible
sale of the information to others (who may then sell it to additional third parties).
We might also anticipate that the company would refrain from activities,
including sale, that they could expect to be adverse to app users’ interests, or

failed to disclose that the app transmitted users’ precise location and unique device identifier
to third parties, including advertising networks.” Press Release, FTC, Android Flashlight App
Developer Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/android-flashlight-app-developersettles-ftc-charges-it-deceived [https://perma.cc/Q25A-KG5U]. According to the FTC
complaint, Goldenshores “represented . . . that [it] may periodically collect, maintain,
process, and use information from users’ mobile devices to provide . . . services to users
related to the Brightest Flashlight App,” but “failed to disclose or failed to adequately disclose
that, when users run the Brightest Flashlight App, the application transmits, or allows the
transmission of, their devices’ precise geolocation along with persistent device identifiers to
various third parties, including third party advertising networks.” Goldenshores Techs., LLC,
157 F.T.C. 700, 705 (2014) (complaint). The FTC also alleged that although the users were
given a choice to accept or reject the user license agreement, which contained terms on data
collection, “the application transmits or causes the transmission of their device data, including
the device’s precise geolocation and persistent identifier, even before they accept or refuse
the terms of the [agreement].” Id. at 704. In May 2020, the New York Attorney General
entered into an agreement with Zoom Video Communications after the former investigated
significant privacy concerns reported in the media regarding Zoom’s videoconferencing
technologies, including: (a) “Zoombombing,” which involved uninvited participants
interrupting conferences; (b) failures to use adequate encryption; (c) collection of Zoom
users’ data by Facebook, even from users without Facebook accounts; (d) data accessing and
unnecessary disclosures by LinkedIn; and (e) leaks of personal information. Letter from Kim
A. Berger, Chief, Bureau of Internet & Tech., New York State Off. of the Att’y Gen., to Travis
LeBlanc,
Cooley
LLP
(May
7,
2020),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files
/nyag_zoom_letter_agreement_final_counter-signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5FA-G82D].
47
See Kurt Wagner, Facebook Shared User Data with Developers Longer than Promised,
BLOOMBERG L. (July 1, 2020, 5:10 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-datasecurity/facebook-shared-user-data-with-developers-longer-than-promised (“If a user of a
third party app was also connected to a Facebook friend through that app, developers are
allowed to pull data from both users at once.”); Shoshana Zuboff, You, Me and a Dark New
Economic Logic, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 26, 2019, at 26 (“Some cellphone apps record
your location as often as every two seconds for sale to third parties. In July 2017, iRobot’s
autonomous vacuum cleaner, Roomba, made headlines when the company’s CEO, Colin
Angle, told Reuters about its data-based business strategy for the ‘smart home’, stating that
its stock price increased after its proposal to share free floor plans of customers’ homes,
scraped from the machine’s new mapping capabilities.”).
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that the company would only engage in those activities subject to app users’
express permission.48
In Hypothetical 2, a brand company contracts with an overseas supplier to
produce brand clothing at a particular price. This price is so low that the overseas
supplier engages in hazardous labor practices to turn a profit, including
subcontracting to informal production sites, enforcing a longer work day of up
to twelve hours, and compromising health and safety precautions at the factory.49
Suppliers are recognized stakeholders of the company they supply; their
employees may also qualify as stakeholders because their welfare can affect the
level of reputational risk that a company faces for “sweatshop conditions”
overseas. We would expect that corporate actors would desist from using
contracting terms once they realize those terms create “sweatshop conditions.”
But despite the desirability of these actions, we witness a disappointing lack
of them—even when corporations recognize that stakeholders are important.
This is because it is not enough to identify the importance of stakeholders or
even the desirable types of stakeholder protection. Instead, the extent, quality,
and nature of that protection depend on its justifications.
B.

The Benefits-Based Approach for Stakeholder Protection

There are many good justifications for stakeholder protection. The trouble is
that these justifications tend to rely on some form of a benefits-based approach
in which stakeholders (Group A) should be protected because doing so brings
some type of benefit—usually to someone else (Group B). The clearest example
of this approach is the “business case” for stakeholder protection, but it is not

48
In numerous ways, the opposite is true. See, e.g., Zuboff, supra note 47, at 29 (“It has
long been understood that capitalism evolves by claiming things that exist outside of the
market dynamic and turning them into market commodities for sale and purchase.
Surveillance capitalism extends this pattern by declaring private human experience as free
raw material that can be computed and fashioned into behavioural predictions for production
and exchange.”).
49
In a number of lawsuits, plaintiffs brought claims against retailers for failure to monitor
and inspect facilities in their supply chains. See, e.g., Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d
677, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of claims by employees of Wal-Mart’s
foreign suppliers against Wal-Mart for failure to adequately monitor factory conditions);
Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174, 2016 WL 2616375, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.
May 4, 2016) (recounting plaintiffs’ allegations that J.C. Penney and others “fail[ed] to ensure
safe and healthy working conditions for [certain] garment factory employees”). In Doe I v.
Wal-Mart, “[p]laintiffs allege[d] that the short deadlines and low prices in Wal-Mart’s supply
contracts force suppliers to violate [Wal-Mart’s] Standards [for Suppliers] in order to satisfy
the terms of the contracts.” 572 F.3d at 680. Additionally, consumers have brought lawsuits
under state consumer protection statutes against companies for failure to disclose the risk of
child labor or forced labor in their supply chains. See, e.g., Complaint for Violation of
California Consumer Protection Laws at 4, Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 15-cv-04450) (alleging Mars did not disclose products made with child
and slave labor).
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the exclusive one. Instead, as discussed below, the category of benefits-based
approaches is much broader and includes a greater diversity of arguments.
The first strand is the business case for stakeholder protection, which
emphasizes the instrumental value of stakeholders for maximizing shareholder
wealth.50 As scholars have explained:
[M]aximizing long-term value for shareholders requires paying close
attention to the effects of the company’s operations on stakeholders. For
example, how the company treats employees could well affect its ability to
attract, retain, and motivate the members of its labor force; how the
company deals with customers could affect its ability to attract and retain
them; and how the company deals with local communities or the
environment could well affect its reputation and standing in ways that
could be important for its success.51
Therefore, “to effectively serve the goal of enhancing long-term shareholder
value, corporate leaders should take into account stakeholder effects—as they
should consider any other relevant factors.”52
But because stakeholderism is instrumental to achieving other goals, the latter
will inevitably limit the strength of the former:
Whenever treating stakeholders well in a given way would be useful for
long-term shareholder value, such treatment would be called for under
either enlightened shareholder value or “old-fashioned” shareholder value.
And whenever treating stakeholders well would not be useful for long-term
shareholder value, such treatment would not be called for under either
enlightened shareholder value or old-fashioned shareholder value.53
Critics point to the fact that director and CEO incentives continue to privilege
shareholder welfare as support for their prediction.54
Other scholars emphasize the risk management function of ESG: consultation
with stakeholder groups can inform management of potential social risks that

50

See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 11, at 97.
Id. at 109.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 110; Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, ‘Stakeholder’ Capitalism Seems Mostly
for Show, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2020, at A15 (“[Corporate leaders] can be expected to protect
other stakeholders only to the extent that doing so would not hurt share value.”).
54
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 11, at 146 (“[T]he labor and control markets do not
provide directors with any incentives to protect or benefit stakeholders. Unlike shareholders
and management, though, stakeholders play no role in and have no power with respect to the
selection or removal of directors. They have no voting rights and no other tool to influence
the election of directors.”); Fisch & Solomon, supra note 19, at 1320 (noting that “corporate
law vests shareholders with some decision-making authority, through their power to elect
directors and vote on certain structural issues such as mergers and bylaw and charter
amendments”); Lund, supra note 11, at 7-10 (discussing disincentives for prosocial goals
created by takeover markets, hedge fund activism, and executive compensation).
51
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may jeopardize the corporation and, by extension, shareholder interests.55 They
argue that it enables superior risk oversight compared to other monitoring
mechanisms because sustainability (a) examines issues broader than legal risk,
thereby identifying problems that may mature into misconduct;56 (b) involves
consultation with a broader set of individuals who may possess unique
information;57 (c) encourages information sharing because of its emphasis on
prevention through nonconfrontational approaches as opposed to sanctions for
past conduct;58 and (d) builds trust between the company and its stakeholders.59
But the business case is not the only form of a benefits-based approach.
Instead, the category of benefits-based arguments includes the business case and
other types of arguments that justify stakeholder protection based on the benefits
that such protection will bring—to the corporation, society, or both. Some of
these arguments have done substantial work in challenging the primacy of
shareholder-centric considerations. However, because the touchstone of these
approaches is some benefit, they risk establishing a circle of care that leaves
some injured by corporate conduct on the outside.
One strand of scholarship views stakeholders as valuable in themselves but
still justifies their protection based on the benefits they bring to the
corporation.60 The “team production” school of corporate law argues that “[i]n
reality, the public corporation is not so much a ‘nexus of contracts’ (explicit or
implicit) as a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments,’ in which several different
groups contribute unique and essential resources to the corporate enterprise, and
who each find it difficult to protect their contribution through explicit
contracts.”61 The lack of visibility of these different groups’ contributions often
55

See, e.g., Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 28, at 1426 (“[B]y operationalizing their
commitment to [ESG] values, companies are also seeking to avert the reputational uproar,
stock price drop, and legal troubles following misconduct.”).
56
See id. at 1426-30.
57
See id. at 1430-35.
58
See id. at 1435-40.
59
See id. at 1440-48; id. at 1466 (“[A] board that completely fails to operationalize
sustainability is simply exposing its shareholders to much greater risk than they would
otherwise have faced. . . . Thus, developing an ESG function and providing the company with
a mechanism for early risk discovery and prevention is an imperative for directors and
officers, who should find themselves in bad faith if they fail to act.”).
60
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250 (1999) (“Our analysis rests on the observation—generally
accepted even by corporate scholars who adhere to the principal-agent model—that
shareholders are not the only group that may provide specialized inputs into corporate
production. Executives, rank-and-file employees, and even creditors or the local community
may also make essential contributions and have an interest in an enterprise’s success.”
(footnote omitted)).
61
See id. at 275; see also Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value
of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 600 (2018) (“Business
corporations consist of separate yet interconnected elements, including human capital
(employees, executives, directors), financial capital (funds raised from operations and from
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leads to the elevation of shareholders over other stakeholders: “Fixating on the
contributions of only one of these groups—shareholders—blinds us to the
essential investments of the others and encourages management to prioritize
shareholder interest alone.”62 Therefore, it is important to recognize how each
member of the “team” contributes to the corporation’s success, and boards of
directors should serve as a “mediating hierarch” that balances the interests of all
those who make firm-specific contributions to the corporation.63 However, this
leads to the inclusion of some stakeholders but not others. For example, some
scholars prioritize employee interests:
The non-separable inputs within team production really belong to
employees and shareholders. Shareholders provide capital that is taken
within the firm and turned into discretionary funds. Employees work
together under the aegis of the firm to produce goods or services in a
manner that generally cannot be separated out to assign specific
values. . . . Employees and shareholders are part of that team production
process in a way that stakeholders outside the firm are not.64
By no means are these views substitutes for one another. However, they share
a belief that stakeholder protection will ultimately generate certain important
benefits—to shareholders, society, or both. As such, they all represent different

equity and debt investors), and physical capital (plant and equipment, inventory). Each
element is distinct and serves a distinct purpose. For example, directors and officers supply
managerial expertise; employees supply labor; the physical plant produces goods for sale; and
financial capital purchases the labor and raw materials needed to produce more goods. These
elements do not exist in isolation vis-à-vis each other. They are interconnected, influencing
each other in ways that allow them to operate as a unified whole, separate and apart from their
individual selves.”).
62
Greenfield, supra note 28, at 761.
63
See Blair & Stout, supra note 60, at 271 (“When the potential for shirking and rentseeking is especially pronounced, team members as a group might prefer to relinquish control
over both the team’s assets and output to a third party—a ‘mediating hierarch’—whose
primary function is to exercise that control in a fashion that maximizes the joint welfare of the
team as a whole.”); cf. id. at 266 (“Team production . . . poses a difficult problem when it
comes to designing efficient incentives. If the team members agree in advance to allocate any
profits according to some fixed sharing rule, obvious free-rider problems arise: Each team
member will have an incentive to shirk, since he will get the same share of the total whether
or not he works hard. On the other hand, if the team members have no fixed sharing rule but
simply agree to allocate rewards after the fact, when the time comes to divvy up the surplus
all have incentives to indulge in wasteful rent-seeking, squandering time and effort haggling
and trying to grab a larger share of the total output. The result in either case is suboptimal.”
(footnote omitted)).
64
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder
Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2419, 2456-57 (2020) (footnotes omitted);
see id. at 2473-76.
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variants of a “benefits-based approach” to stakeholderism that, as discussed
below, may ultimately fail to protect stakeholders in important ways.65
C.

The Limits of a Benefits Approach to Stakeholderism: Lack of Interest
Convergence Between Shareholders and Stakeholders

The main limitation of a benefits approach to stakeholderism is that, in many
situations, stakeholder protection does not benefit the corporation. If it were in
a corporation’s interest to protect its stakeholders, then the social media
company would not sell app users’ data for profit,66 and the clothing company
would not dictate price terms so low so as to create risks of physical harms to
the workers at its overseas factories.67 Corporations fail to protect even
significant stakeholders because, sometimes, the corporation may benefit from
their exploitation. Otherwise, we would likely observe corporations acting
differently than they currently do.
The root of this limitation is the lack of interest convergence between
corporate actors and stakeholders.68 What is good for the stakeholder is not
always good for the company.69 Instead, stakeholder dynamics can fall within at
least three plausible scenarios. The effectiveness of the benefits approach
depends on which of these scenarios accurately describes a particular interaction
between a corporation and its stakeholders. As illustrated below in Figure 1, the
benefits approach may be sufficient to justify stakeholder protection in
Scenario 1, but becomes increasingly inadequate as we move along the spectrum
to Scenarios 2 and 3.

65
See Lund & Pollman, supra note 30, at 2631 (“[T]ying the consideration of stakeholder
welfare to long-term shareholder value limits acceptable rationales and favors activity that
can be reduced to measurable metrics tied to risk or financial value. It also renders the
promotion of stakeholder welfare that cannot be justified as benefitting shareholders as
outside the bounds of acceptable corporate activity, no matter the overall welfare benefits.”).
66
For an illustration of this hypothetical scenario, see infra Section III.B.1.
67
For an illustration of this hypothetical scenario, see infra Section III.B.2.
68
See Bell, supra note 32, at 523; Lund & Pollman, supra note 30, at 2609-12.
69
See Lund, supra note 11, at 7-10.
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Figure 1. Stakeholder Protection Based on Interest Convergence.

In Scenario 1 (“interest convergence”), stakeholder and corporate interests
converge: addressing the needs of various stakeholders will also benefit the
company (and its shareholders). Interest convergence occurs when direct costs
to stakeholders who are directly harmed by the misconduct lead to derivative
costs to corporations in terms of reputational, litigation, and regulatory
(compliance) threats. For example, poor labor practices overseas can harm a
variety of stakeholders, including employees of overseas suppliers and
consumers (direct costs).70 These practices also threaten corporate well-being
by leading to reputational losses, litigation threats, and even regulatory
investigations and legislative action (derivative costs).
Stakeholder protection can offer a means for corporate actors to minimize the
prospect of derivative costs by preventing direct costs to stakeholders. For
example, corporations can manage both types of costs by consulting with
stakeholders as part of risk management.71 Stakeholders benefit by raising
pressing issues with corporate representatives; these representatives benefit by
gaining information of which they may have been unaware and that can be used
to protect the company from a variety of risks.72 By addressing these risks, the
corporate representatives protect both the interests of stakeholders and the
interests of shareholders.
But not all direct costs impose derivative costs on corporations. In Scenario 2
(“interest stalemate”), management may be ambivalent about risks to
70
See, e.g., Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2009)
(recounting claims by foreign suppliers’ employees against Wal-Mart for working conditions
in suppliers’ factories).
71
See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 28, at 1466.
72
Id. at 1432.
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stakeholders because, if realized, those risks do not trigger the types of derivative
costs that endanger corporations. For example, some misconduct that imposes
direct costs on stakeholders will lead to minimal reputational risks to the
corporation because of limited media coverage, perceived insignificance of
issues, and lack of interest among constituents who exercise leverage on the
corporation.73 Similarly, some misconduct will not lead to a viable litigation
threat because there may be no cause of action with which to hold the
corporation accountable.74 Finally, legislators and regulators may lack the
information, capacity, or will to respond to misconduct with legislative reform
or heightened regulatory standards.75 These limitations introduce a break in the
chain between direct costs and derivative costs: what is bad for stakeholders is
not necessarily bad for a corporation’s management and its shareholders. Here,
stakeholder protection has limited instrumental value; thus, under a benefits
approach, corporate management is unlikely to consider the needs of
stakeholders.
Finally, there are situations in which what is best for the company is worst for
other stakeholders. In Scenario 3 (“interest conflict”), the corporation may
benefit financially from neglecting or even harming one or more stakeholder
groups. Here, direct costs to stakeholders lead to derivative benefits to
shareholders. Therefore, it does not benefit the corporation to address
stakeholder concerns: it benefits them to impose the harm.
Which of these scenarios best captures reality? That is an open empirical
question. If Scenario 1 describes the majority of stakeholder-corporation
interactions, then a benefits approach is adequate to protect stakeholders:
corporate actors protect stakeholder interests because doing so also protects the
interests of the corporation. If Scenario 2 is the reality, then derivative costs will
not follow from direct costs to stakeholders and, as a result, corporate actors may
have little motivation to protect stakeholders because they have not incurred
sufficient derivative costs. If Scenario 3 is the reality, then we can’t expect
corporate actors to protect stakeholder interests because doing so wouldn’t
73

See Nicole Deitelhoff & Klaus Dieter Wolf, Business and Human Rights: How
Corporate Norm Violators Become Norm Entrepreneurs, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 222, 229 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2013)
(noting that not all companies and sectors are vulnerable to consumer boycotts); cf. Kathryn
Sikkink, Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the WHO/UNICEF
Code, 40 INT’L ORG. 815, 823-33 (1986) (describing “special convergence of favorable
characteristics” that led Nestlé to adopt infant formula marketing code in an effort to appease
critics).
74
See, e.g., Doe I, 572 F.3d at 685 (“[W]e conclude that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim
against Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart had no legal duty under [its Supplier] Standards or common law
negligence principles to monitor its suppliers or to protect Plaintiffs from the suppliers’
alleged substandard labor practices.” (footnote omitted)); Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No.
N15C-07-174, 2016 WL 2616375, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016) (“Just as in Doe I v.
Wal-Mart, Plaintiffs in this case have failed to allege facts to establish that Defendants owed
Plaintiffs a duty of care.”).
75
See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 28, at 1436-37.
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benefit them; in fact, it would hurt them. The benefits approach only works if
Scenario 1 describes reality; if not, the benefits approach fails to protect
stakeholders most of the time. Reality most likely falls among all three scenarios.
Stakeholders in Scenario 1 will receive protection; stakeholders in Scenarios 2
or 3 will not. The result is a skewed patchwork of protection for some
stakeholders but not others.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that a comparable thought exercise can
apply to other variants of the benefits-based approach. For example, there may
be situations in which the envisioned stakeholder protection does not bring about
the expected societal benefits. The question is whether stakeholder protection is
jeopardized if these benefits fail to materialize.
D.

The Problem with the Benefits Approach in Practice: Illustrative
Examples

In order to demonstrate the limitations of the benefits approach, this Section
revisits the hypotheticals discussed above.76 In Hypothetical 1, users of the
social media app certainly bring a range of benefits to the social media company.
However, what is in the best interest of these users may not be in the best interest
of the company. Instead, it is often in the financial interest of the latter to collect
information about its users—volunteered and otherwise—that it then sells to
third parties.77 This is a classic example of interest conflict (Scenario 3) because
the types of privacy controls desirable to users may be contrary to the social
media company’s financial objectives—especially when some, such as Apple
CEO Tim Cook, claim that the business of such social media companies is the
users’ information.78 For example, one sociologist has argued the following:
76

See supra Section I.A.
See generally, e.g., APPLE INC., A DAY IN THE LIFE OF YOUR DATA (2021) (describing
how user data is collected, tracked, shared, and utilized by Apple, app developers, third-party
data brokers, advertisers, and other entities); Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Facebook’s
Surveillance
Machine,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/facebook-cambridge-analytica.html
(explaining how Cambridge Analytica offered to pay Facebook users to download and use
personality quiz app on Facebook that “‘scraped’ information from their Facebook profiles as
well as detailed information from their friends’ profiles” which “Facebook then
provided . . . to the makers of the app, who in turn turned it over to Cambridge Analytica”).
78
Apple CEO Tim Cook Takes Shots at Facebook over Online Privacy, MKT. WATCH (Jan.
28, 2021, 7:25 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/apple-ceo-tim-cook-takes-shots-atfacebook-over-online-privacy-01611879927 (reporting Cook’s statement that “[t]oo many
[social media companies] are still asking the question ‘how much can we get away with?’
when we should be asking ‘what are the consequences?’”); Matthew Panzarino, Apple’s Tim
Cook Delivers Blistering Speech on Encryption, Privacy, TECHCRUNCH (June 2, 2015, 5:34
PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/02/apples-tim-cook-delivers-blistering-speech-onencryption-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/6XHZ-KLTV] (reporting Cook’s statement: “I’m
speaking to you from Silicon Valley, where some of the most prominent and successful
companies have built their businesses by lulling their customers into complacency about their
personal information. . . . They’re gobbling up everything they can learn about you and trying
77
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“Facebook makes money . . . by profiling us and then selling our attention to
advertisers, political actors and others. These are Facebook’s true customers,
whom it works hard to please.”79 It may also not be in the interests of these
companies to safeguard the security of their users’ information from third parties
because the companies are not the ones who suffer directly from the harms that
may result: “Because companies do not have to internalize the[] negative
externalities borne by individuals, the number of data breaches continues to
grow.”80
In Hypothetical 2, a number of companies benefit from decreasing payments
to their suppliers while simultaneously increasing production volume and
shortening delivery times.81 These choices benefit companies’ marketing efforts,
sales, and production of goods, helping to maximize profits.82 In certain
circumstances, the reputational backlash from “sweatshop conditions” may
persuade companies to change these contract parameters because the direct costs
to suppliers lead to negative derivative costs for corporations (Scenario 1); in
other situations, not so much (Scenario 3).
For example, following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many brandname companies, such as Kohl’s and Primark, suspended or canceled their
orders with their foreign suppliers.83 Other companies, such as Marks and
Spencer or PVH Corporation (the parent company of Calvin Klein and Tommy
Hilfiger, among others) used the pandemic to unilaterally modify contracts to
extend payment terms, such as from 90 days to 120 days; still others requested
deep discounts that applied retroactively.84 Many took these actions even when
they could afford not to do so and when the suppliers had already produced the
goods and when these companies knew (or could reasonably predict) the
to monetize it. We think that’s wrong. And it’s not the kind of company that Apple wants to
be.”); see also Tufekci, supra note 77 (arguing that Cambridge Analytica scandal was “an alltoo-natural consequence of Facebook’s business model, which involves having people go to
the site for social interaction, only to be quietly subjected to an enormous level of
surveillance”).
79
Tufekci, supra note 77.
80
Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 745 (2018).
81
See, e.g., Mark Anner, Squeezing Workers’ Rights in Global Supply Chains: Purchasing
Practices in the Bangladesh Garment Export Sector in Comparative Perspective, 27 REV.
INT’L POL. ECON. 320, 321 (2020) (recognizing that fashion brands compete with low retail
prices and high speed to market through “source squeezing” on suppliers).
82
Id. Other contributing factors include increased competition among suppliers,
technological innovation that augments the power of lead firms, and “growing pressure from
investors on lead firms to reduce costs and increase margins.” Id. at 323.
83
JEFF VOGT, INT’L LAWS. ASSISTING WORKERS NETWORK; MIRIAM SAAGE-MAAß & BEN
VANPEPERSTRAETE, EUR. CTR. FOR CONST. & HUM. RTS.; BEN HENSLER, WORKER RTS.
CONSORTIUM, FARCE MAJEURE: HOW GLOBAL APPAREL BRANDS ARE USING THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC TO STIFF SUPPLIERS AND ABANDON WORKERS 5-7 (Corey Barber & Arite Keller
eds., 2020).
84
Id. at 7.
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consequences of terminated contracts for the suppliers (and their workers).85
Following consumer backlash, some companies reversed course and agreed to
honor the terms of the original purchase orders.86 Many still refused to do so,
even when the business case would have recommended another course of action;
suppliers are important stakeholders and it would serve the interests of brand
companies to maintain the operational viability and loyalty of these companies
for post-pandemic operations.87 Additionally, the consequences of terminated
contracts, including the harms suffered by overseas workers, can and did expose
the brand companies to reputational harm.88 But despite these benefits from
protecting stakeholders, many companies still chose not to do so. This is but one
example of corporations imposing direct costs on stakeholders because it
benefits the corporation to do so.
In both of these examples, the benefits approach to stakeholderism falls short:
Corporations do not protect their stakeholders when it does not benefit them to
do so or when they benefit by imposing the harm. To protect stakeholders
effectively, we need to shift our foundations for stakeholder protection from
receipt of benefits to prevention of harms.
II.

SHIFTING STAKEHOLDERISM FROM BENEFITS TO HARMS

A better normative basis for stakeholder protection focuses on the threatened
harms from corporate conduct rather than the perceived benefits of stakeholder
protection. The prevention of harms requires closer examination of a
corporation’s contracting practices. Contracts are the primary means through
which corporations interact in society. Many harms befalling stakeholders
originate in various contracts that corporations maintain: arbitration agreements
that foreclose the possibility of litigation, thereby impeding consumer rights;89
employment agreements that force workers to give up privacy rights at the
workplace;90 and more. These contracts can reduce the well-being of signatories,
but the promised performance can increase or decrease the well-being of one or
more individuals who were never part of the deal.91
A harms-based stakeholderism approach requires corporations to consider the
effects on stakeholders when they negotiate, draft, and sign contracts with
others—even if doing so doesn’t bring any tangible benefits to corporations.
85

Id. at 4-7, 11.
Id. at 1-2.
87
Id. at 2, 7-8.
88
See id. at 1-2.
89
See Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action
Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 329, 336-40 (2015).
90
See Daniel P. O’Gorman, Looking Out for Your Employees: Employers’ Surreptitious
Physical Surveillance of Employees and the Tort of Invasion of Privacy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 212,
253-54 (2006).
91
Bagchi, supra note 34, at 212.
86
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This is because the act of contracting sets into motion processes that may not
have otherwise occurred. While both the contracting parties and the broader
public may reap considerable benefits from those processes, each may also be at
risk for various types of harms; however, only parties are afforded an
opportunity to consent to and address those risks that the contract creates.
Section II.A describes the unique vulnerabilities that a contract creates for both
contracting parties and third parties. While both are vulnerable, five dimensions
of inequality distinguish the powers of contracting parties and third parties:
notice, choice, risk management, legal remedies, and fruits of exchange.
A.

Vulnerabilities in Contracts: Contract Parties vs. Third Parties

Each contracting party’s risk originates in its vulnerability to the other party
or parties. Contractual vulnerability is particularly acute in “idiosyncratic
exchanges” which refer to goods and services “where investments of
transaction-specific human and physical capital are made and, contingent upon
successful execution, benefits are realized.”92 These types of exchanges leave
contracting parties particularly vulnerable because the transaction-specific
investments lead to a “bilateral monopoly.”93 As a result:
[B]oth buyer and seller are strategically situated to bargain over the
disposition of any incremental gain whenever a proposal to adapt is made
by the other party. Although both have a long-term interest in effecting
adaptations of a joint profit-maximizing kind, each also has an interest in
appropriating as much of the gain as he can on each occasion to adapt.94
A famous example involves General Motors and its supplier, Fisher Body
Corporation.95 The parties’ contract contemplated that Fisher Body make highly
specific investments to produce automobile bodies for General Motors; the level
of specificity created the risk that General Motors could leverage the
investments by threatening to purchase a lower output, or none at all, unless
Fisher Body reduced the price.96
Notably, these vulnerabilities result from contract design.97 The same contract
that creates the potential for profit also creates the possibility of harm. For
example, franchises create the possibility of immense wealth for both
92
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 240-41 (1979).
93
Id. at 241; see also Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 121 (1988) (“Once . . . relationship-specific investments have been
made the parties are (at least partially) ‘locked in,’ and hence they are at each other’s mercy
and opportunistic behavior may rule.”).
94
Williamson, supra note 92, at 242.
95
See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual
Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 445-46 (1996).
96
Id. at 445. In practice, the contract design solution that was adopted to prevent this type
of hold-up resulted in General Motors being held up by Fisher Body. Id. at 446-47.
97
See id. at 446.

2022]

CONTRACTUAL STAKEHOLDERISM

893

franchisors (through sales, fees, and royalties)98 and franchisees (through
profits).99 However, the arrangement places the two parties in a position of
vulnerability vis-à-vis the other. Franchisors are vulnerable to free riding by
franchisees who may sacrifice quality control to maximize profits, thereby
placing the franchisor at risk if poor quality control jeopardizes the franchisor’s
trademark and broader franchise.100 Conversely, franchisees are vulnerable to
franchisors leveraging franchisee capital investments by raising prices or
increasing volume requirements, among other efforts.101
But contracting parties are not the only ones who may confront risks of harm.
Stakeholders may also be affected as contractual third parties. For example, all
of the stakeholders discussed in the previous hypotheticals are injured as a result
of the contracts that a corporation enters into with another party. In
Hypothetical 1, the contracts at issue are between the social media company and,
for example, a marketing company, but the exchanged performance—money for
data sharing—affects the interests, if not rights, of all the users who use that
platform.102 In Hypothetical 2, supply contracts between a corporation and its
suppliers create the risks of labor, safety, and health risks—even human
trafficking—for those individuals who are employed by the supplier or
subcontractor.103 While they did not sign the supply contract, their rights will be
affected by the price, volume, and other terms set in that agreement.104 These
examples highlight how stakeholders—as contractual third parties—can still
suffer from the terms of corporate agreements.
B.

Disparities in Risk Acceptance, Management, and Compensation

There’s something particularly disturbing about subjecting individuals to
risks of harms to which they have not consented; this is the problem of
unconsented risk. But this problem is compounded when we allow a different
class of individuals to consent before it is subject to similar risks from the same
source; this is the problem of disparity in risk acceptance. This disparity is
evident in five distinct contexts: notice, choice, risk management, legal
remedies, and fruits of exchange.
First, unlike third parties, contracting parties have notice of the risks the
contract creates because they are the agents of its creation; as such, they have
information about how the contract is designed to unfold and the foreseeable
consequences of performance.105 Admittedly, even contracting parties cannot
98
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 935-36 (1990).
99
See id. at 950, 958.
100
Id. at 949-50.
101
Id. at 951-52.
102
See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
103
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
104
See Anner, supra note 81, at 321.
105
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 95, at 447 (“General Motors and Fisher Body were aware
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envision all possible outcomes of performance.106 The literature on “incomplete
contracts” highlights the challenge of attempting to anticipate all contingencies
in an efficient manner.107 But contracting parties more likely struggle to predict
the unforeseen causes of breach than the expected consequences of performance.
A contract may be breached for a number of reasons—some predictable,
others not. For example, with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, parties may
not have foreseen the possibilities of a pandemic, governmental responses, and
the effects on the parties’ abilities to fulfill their contractual obligations.108
Therefore, they may not have included language in their force majeure clause
that addresses the pandemic109—or may even have neglected to include a force
majeure clause at all.110 The parties were therefore stuck with a risk allocation
they may not have agreed to had they anticipated the possibility and
consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.111
of the hold-up problems inherent in their relationship, and both Fisher and General Motors
had to have been aware that the contract they adopted to solve their hold-up problem was
‘defective’ in the sense that it contained obvious malincentives.”).
106
See, e.g., Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Incomplete Contracts and the Governance of Complex
Contractual Relationships, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 432, 435 (1995) (describing two ways
contracting parties introduce flexibility in incomplete contracts to efficiently address
contingencies: intentional ambiguity and alternative governance instruments, such as
reputation, property rights, or legal system).
107
See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 98, at 947 (“[T]he key characteristic of the franchise
contract is its incompleteness.”); id. at 947-48 (“To write a complete contract for this purpose
would be to attempt to reduce to written form a complete listing of all the different business
decisions that the franchisor could undertake under all possible future circumstances, and also
to specify the range of compliance responses available to the franchisee in each
case. . . . [T]his is an essentially impossible task . . . .”).
108
See Colin C. Holley, A Closer Look at the Coronavirus Pandemic as a Force Majeure
Event, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_
insurance_practice/publications/committee-newsletters/closer_look_coronavirus_pandemic/.
109
See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Carolan, Not ‘If’ but ‘When’ — Navigating a Force Majeure
Clause During the COVID-19 Pandemic, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (Mar. 14, 2020),
https://www.foxrothschild.com/publications/not-if-but-when-navigating-a-force-majeureclause-during-the-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/F743-BNRK] (“Whether COVID-19
may be considered a force majeure for purposes of excusing a party from a contractual
obligation depends almost entirely on the express language of the provision and the
circumstances it seemingly anticipates.”); Holley, supra note 108 (noting key issues in
interpretation of force majeure clauses amidst pandemic, including ambiguity as to whether
COVID-19 pandemic triggers force majeure clauses that do not specifically reference
disease).
110
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint at 1, Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC v. Herald
Square Owner LLC, No. 651833/2020, 2021 WL 69146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 2021) (noting
plaintiff tenant’s argument that lease should be annulled due to COVID-19 pandemic, despite
lack of force majeure clause in agreement, under doctrines of impossibility and frustration of
purpose).
111
Victoria’s Secret, 2021 WL 69146, at *1 (granting defendant landlord’s motion for
summary judgment and rejecting plaintiff’s tenant’s “mistaken theory” that rent should be
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Putting aside arguably unpredictable events, contracting parties can more
easily predict the consequences of contract performance than third parties can
because performance occurs principally one way—as the parties designed. And
even if the parties cannot predict every consequence of performance, they are
empowered in the course of performance to decide if the risk of unknowns is too
great to proceed.
Second, contracting parties can control whether they are at risk at all because
they are the ones who decide whether the contract, with its attendant risks, comes
into being.112 The contract only binds them with their consent, and they are not
subject to its risks absent this consent. They are thus protected from unconsented
risks, whereas third parties are by definition subjected to contractual risks
without their consent.113
Third, contracting parties can manage risks to themselves through contract
design. Admittedly, contract design is not always perfect at risk management;
contracting parties may continue to suffer from risks they did not anticipate or
adequately guard against.114 But their seats at the bargaining table provide them
with some measure of control over the risks that the contract may create for
them. They may not exercise this control well or it may be limited by other
factors, such as the bargaining power of the counterparty.115 But that is beside
the point. Contracting parties are both afforded a say in whether they will be
subject to contractual risks at all and have the opportunity to exercise some
measure of risk management through contract design. In contrast, third parties
are not able to control these risks through ex ante contract design because they
are not present at the bargaining table.116
Fourth, our laws recognize and remedy risks to contracting parties but not
third parties. Contract law recognizes risks to contracting parties and has
developed doctrines addressing modification,117 duress,118 and restitution,119 for
example, which help mitigate these risks and provide the contracting parties with
a remedy for injuries sustained. Third parties are not so fortunate. Their best bet

excused because “the parties did not allocate the risk of tenant not being able to operate its
business”).
112
See Parella, supra note 37, at 384.
113
See id. at 329.
114
See Klein, supra note 95, at 447.
115
See, e.g., Gatti & Ondersma, supra note 11, at 24 (noting that workers and consumers
contracting directly with corporations lack meaningful bargaining power and are therefore
largely incapable of protecting themselves through contract design).
116
Parella, supra note 37, at 343.
117
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 89 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
118
Id. § 175.
119
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. L. INST.
2011).
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is to claim that they are third-party beneficiaries of promises exchanged by the
contracting parties.120 Unfortunately, this does not often succeed.121
In Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,122 employees of Wal-Mart’s numerous
overseas suppliers alleged that Wal-Mart’s failure to exercise its contractually
guaranteed inspection rights facilitated serious labor violations.123 Plaintiffs also
argued that the supply contracts’ design created numerous risks to them: “[T]he
short deadlines and low prices in Wal-Mart’s supply contracts force[d] suppliers
to violate [Walmart’s] Standards [for Suppliers] in order to satisfy the terms of
the contracts.”124 The Ninth Circuit rejected their third-party beneficiary claims,
explaining that the contracts provided Wal-Mart with inspection rights but not
duties to exercise those rights: “Because, as we view the supply contracts, WalMart made no promise to monitor the suppliers, no such promise flows to
Plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries.”125
Finally, contracting parties expect to receive benefits that outweigh the risks
of harms to them. They are the most direct beneficiaries of the fruits of exchange.
While they assume risks, they also incur benefits. Third parties are subject to the
former, but do not necessarily enjoy the latter.
What normative foundation permits contracting parties to protect themselves
from risks but does not allow third parties to do so? This disparity grows starker
when we realize that contracting parties and third parties face distinct risks. In
certain situations, the risks confronting third parties are particularly grave and
pose physical threats to life and limb.126 Despite the gravity of these risks, third
parties are not afforded a say in whether they should be subject to them.

120
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third-Party Beneficiaries and Contractual
Networks, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 330 (2015).
121
See id. at 350 (finding that courts recognized third-party beneficiary in only 35% of
third-party beneficiary claims); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 25, at 1517 (“We found
that the designers of these [acquisition] agreements generally elected to explicitly deny thirdparty beneficiaries, including employees, any power to enforce provisions that purportedly
would protect them.”).
122
572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
123
Id. at 680.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 681-82 (“The language and structure of the agreement show that Wal-Mart
reserved the right to inspect the suppliers, but did not adopt a duty to inspect them.”).
126
See, e.g., Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-cv-07307, 2007 WL 5975664, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (“The non-California Plaintiffs are workers in Defendant’s
suppliers’ garment factories in China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Swaziland, and Nicaragua. The
non-California Plaintiffs have suffered from various poor working conditions, including
excessive hours or days of work, withheld pay, confiscation of withheld pay, overtime without
pay, less than minimum-wage pay, denial of overtime pay, less than required rest periods,
lack of safety equipment, denial of maternity benefits, discrimination because of union
activities, and physical abuse.” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
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III. OPERATIONALIZING CONTRACTUAL STAKEHOLDERISM: INTRODUCING A
DUTY TO CONTRACT
It is not enough to shift the normative foundation for stakeholder protection
from receipt of benefits to prevention of harms. The next critical step is to
operationalize this harms-based approach. This Article argues that if contracts
are the mechanism by which stakeholders are injured, then the solution is to
target the contracts that corporations execute. Section III.A proposes a duty
intended to incentivize corporate leaders to consider the potential harms that
their contracting choices impose on third parties. Such an incentive could change
their contracting behavior and reduce or eliminate the risks that these contracts
pose to stakeholders, even when protecting those stakeholders does not benefit
the corporation. Section III.B applies this proposed duty to the two hypotheticals
discussed earlier in the Article.
A.

Implementing a Harms-Based Approach to Contracting: Proposing a
Duty to Contract

To operationalize a harms-based approach, this Section proposes a duty to
contract: Corporations, as contracting parties, must take into account
stakeholders’ interests when performance of the contract creates a risk of harm
to them. This duty is grounded in the prevention of harm rather than the
provision of benefits. Thus, it is triggered by the potential for harm.
This does not involve a new duty per se but the application of a classic tort
duty to the activity of contracting. We are required to exercise reasonable care
in our conduct when that conduct creates a risk of harm to others.127 Contracting
should be no different. Contracts legally bind the parties to set into motion a
particular chain of events that may not have occurred in the absence of the
parties’ agreement. The consequences of these events do not fall on the
contracting parties exclusively; instead, they can also fall on various third parties
and range from positive effects to grave harms.
Subjecting contracting to the duty of reasonable care is to remove it from
some exemption that it has acquired over the years through contracting practice
and judicial blessing. It is time to subject contracting to the same rules by which
we live the other dimensions of our lives. This does not present a revolution in
contract law but a restoration of tort law. It is true that they abut each other in
this instance. But that does not mean that the latter should cede ground to the
former just because the conduct at issue takes a contracting form. Contracting is
not special; as conduct, it creates risks of harm that must be addressed under tort
law. Contracting parties are not special either; as actors, they are liable when

127

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (AM.
L. INST. 2010) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s
conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”); see also id. cmt. o (“An actor’s conduct creates a
risk when the actor’s conduct or course of conduct results in greater risk to another than the
other would have faced absent the conduct.”).
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they fail to exercise reasonable care while engaging in contracting activity that
creates harm to others.
Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts identifies three primary factors
to consider in evaluating whether a person’s conduct lacks reasonable care:
(a) “foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm,”128
(b) “the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue,”129 and (c) “the burden
of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”130 Comment d to section
3 clarifies that these factors “are most relevant in cases in which the actor is
generally aware of some risk entailed by conduct yet because of the burden of
risk prevention is willing to tolerate that risk.”131 To address risks, the
Restatement advocates in favor of a “risk-benefit” analysis “where the ‘risk’ is
the overall level of the foreseeable risk created by the actor’s conduct and the
‘benefit’ is the advantages that the actor or others gain if the actor refrains from
taking precautions.”132
Reasonable contract design depends on the risk-benefit analysis advocated in
section 3. Comment f further clarifies:
[E]ven if the likelihood of harm stemming from the actor’s conduct is
small, the actor can be negligent if the severity of the possible harm is great
and the burden of precautions is limited. Similarly, even if the severity of
expected harm is low, the person can be negligent if the likelihood of harm
is high and the burden of risk prevention limited.133
In a contractual setting, risk refers to the severity and likelihood of harms to third
parties, whereas burden of precautions refers to the costs contracting parties
would incur to mitigate or eliminate that risk.
One way that contracting parties can fulfill this contractual duty is to perform
“stakeholder impact assessments” that subsequently inform the formal contract
negotiations and design between the parties.134 The value of these assessments
is that they can identify the contractual obligations that raise particular risks and
guide parties on the appropriate contractual responses.135 As Table 1 shows,
128

Id. § 3.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. § 3 cmt. d.
132
Id. § 3 cmt. e.
133
Id. § 3 cmt. f.
134
The Restatement (Third) explains: “Foreseeability often relates to practical
considerations concerning the actor’s ability to anticipate future events or to understand
dangerous conditions that already exist. In such cases, what is foreseeable concerns what the
actor ‘should have known.’” Id. § 3 cmt. g. In situations when an actor could only learn of
danger by gathering information, courts “take into account the likely benefit in risk reduction
the actor could have achieved by endeavoring to gather more information before engaging in
conduct, and also the burden the actor would have borne in making such an effort.” Id.
135
See U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
CONTRACTS: INTEGRATING THE MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS RISKS INTO STATEINVESTOR CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, at 6-10, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/15/1, U.N. Sales No.
129

2022]

CONTRACTUAL STAKEHOLDERISM

899

contracting parties would cross-reference two data points: (a) the nature and
magnitude of the risk136 and (b) potential for contract reform to mitigate the
risk.137
Table 1. Contract Planning in Response to Stakeholder Impacts and Contract
Design Options.

Contract Reform
High
Contract Reform
Low

Stakeholder Impact
High
Reform the contractual
obligation
Eliminate the
contractual obligation

Stakeholder Impact
Low
Reform the contractual
obligation
Contract design
excused

When the nature and extent of the stakeholder impact is high (stakeholder
impact high), contracting parties foresee the possibility that their contracting
choices create the risk of physical harm; they are therefore bound to exercise
reasonable care in contracting.138 They are then left with two options depending
on the possibilities for contract reform. If contracting parties can mitigate or
eliminate the risks through contract design (contract reform high), we can
imagine that they would include the contractual obligation but with the reformed
provisions. If contractual reform does not adequately mitigate or eliminate the
risk (contract reform low), then we would expect the contracting parties to
eliminate the underlying contractual obligation.139
When the stakeholder impact is low (stakeholder impact low), contracting
parties cannot reasonably foresee that stakeholders may be injured as a result of
their contracting choices.140 Stakeholders may be injured, but the types of
E.15.XIV.5 (2015); id. at 11 (“For the business investor, it is important to complete a first
[human rights risk] assessment as early as possible, even before contract negotiation, to better
understand from the outset the project’s potential risks and benefits to people.”).
136
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. e
(AM. L. INST. 2010) (“‘[M]agnitude of the risk’ includes both the foreseeable likelihood of
harm and the foreseeable severity of harm that might ensue.”).
137
See Corporate Human Rights Risk Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation Act of
2019,
116th
Cong.
§3
(discussion
draft
July
2,
2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-116pih-corphuman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9JB-JAAG] (proposing that public companies file annual report listing
“any human rights risks” in their operations ranked based on gravity of harm and “any
anticipated challenges in remedying any potential harm”).
138
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
(AM. L. INST. 2010).
139
See id. § 3 cmt. i (“In identifying a precaution that should have been adopted, the party
alleging negligence need not prove that the precaution would have entirely eliminated the risk
of harm. The party can instead prove that the precaution, if implemented, would have reduced
that risk.”).
140
See id. § 3.
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injuries they suffer do not generally result from the kinds of risks that flow
naturally from the contract as designed.141 Here, the stakeholder risk is outside
the scope of the contracting parties’ liability. Because we want to incentivize
greater caution in contracting, it may be advisable for contracting parties to
reform the contract if feasible (contract reform high) but not eliminate the
contractual obligation. If contract design has limited effectiveness for managing
risks and the stakeholder impact is low, then corporate leaders may be excused
from including provisions that specifically address stakeholder risks.
But these data points—and the recommended contractual response—are only
as good as the information supporting them. Whether stakeholder impact is low
or high depends on the quality of information, and we can expect that contracting
parties would engage with stakeholders to ensure that this information is as
accurate as possible. The contracts could also contain provisions for
postformation stakeholder consultation, such as consultations triggered by
certain events.142 These consultations could allow contracting parties to gather
additional information from impacted stakeholders if certain events
materialize.143
The duty proposed here is broad, with far-reaching implications for how
parties engage in contracting. This may invite anxiety over unlimited liability
for anyone who enters into a contract. Such anxiety is misplaced. Section 29 of
the Restatement (Third) provides the limiting principle to liability: “An actor’s
liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s
conduct tortious.”144 As such, a contracting party is not liable for every harm
that befalls any third party as a result of the contract’s performance. Instead,
liability would depend on the types of risks that the contract creates and whether
the harm suffered is a product of one of those risks coming to fruition.145 A
contract, like any conduct, creates a penumbra of risks around it. It sets in motion
a chain of events, and those events create risks. If the harm suffered is a product
of one or more of those risks, it is within the penumbra of risks created by the
contract and should trigger liability for the contracting party.
Therefore, the inquiry begins by asking what foreseeable risks a contract
creates for third parties. Without a duty that requires them to engage in this
141

See id. § 29 cmt. d (“[A]n actor should be held liable only for harm that was among the
potential harms—the risks—that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”).
142
See, e.g., Andrew Johnston, Kenneth Amaeshi, Emmanuel Adegbite & Onyeka Osuji,
Corporate Social Responsibility as Obligated Internalisation of Social Costs, 170 J. BUS.
ETHICS 39, 41 (2021) (“[C]orporations should be mandated to establish ‘hybrid fora’, which
would bring together creators of, and those affected by, externalities in order to trace those
social costs and identify mutually acceptable solutions to them.”).
143
See Shelby, supra note 34, at 1296 (“Providing a mechanism to require input from
community members that are the targeted beneficiaries of [opportunity zone] investments
could reduce at least some of the negative externalities generated by these schemes.”).
144
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (AM.
L. INST. 2010).
145
See id.
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foreseeability analysis, contracting parties may only consider those foreseeable
risks a contract creates for them. However, third parties may still be at risk as a
result of contract design choices; they just lack a voice at the bargaining table
communicating these risks. The proposed duty supplies the incentive for
contracting parties to consider risks to those absent from the bargaining table.
B.

Application of the Duty to Contract to Illustrative Examples

As discussed above, the proposed duty may be less relevant where regulation
already requires that parties’ address negative externalities in their transaction
design.146 However, the following Section applies the proposed duty to the two
hypotheticals selected as case illustrations because they involve areas in which
current regulations do not sufficiently address the harmful externalities caused
by corporate conduct. In the privacy context, “[s]ome people’s decision to share
their personal information may allow the parties accessing to the information to
know more or better about others, those who choose not to share their
information.”147 According to research on privacy:
Information externalities have been more potent due to significant
advances in big data analytics which have made it possible to draw more
accurate inference [sic] about those consumers who had not shared their
data based on the data gleaned from those who had shared. In this
environment, even if each user supposedly is aware of the potential harm
of personal data release to herself, she may not take into account the entire
spillover effects of her data release, either positive or negative, on other
users.148
In the supply chain context, corporate misconduct is facilitated by supply chain
organization technology, regulatory competition, jurisdictional constraints, and
challenges with detection, monitoring, and sanctions:
Brands compete for market share in order to maintain or grow their
revenue. This includes pursuing continuous sales growth with low retail
prices and ever-changing products and shorter fashion seasons. This ‘fast
fashion’ marketing model requires increasingly shorter production lead
times. . . . Lead firms also can use their supply chain power to modify order
volume and increase styles, which creates further stress on suppliers. This
‘sourcing squeeze’ on suppliers – which interacts with the pricing squeeze
since lower prices help to increase inventory turnover – impacts workers in
146

See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 39, at 238 (“The government imposes regulatory costs
on transactions in the form of taxes, securities-law disclosure requirements, antitrust
constraints, environmental-compliance obligations, and so on.”).
147
Jay Pil Choi, Doh-Shin Jeon & Byung-Cheol Kim, Privacy and Personal Data
Collection with Information Externalities, 173 J. PUB. ECON. 113, 114 (2019).
148
Id.; see also id. (constructing theoretical model of data privacy and finding that, with
respect to small websites, “even if each website alone has no incentives to collect personal
data due to its small scale of operation, the emergence of data brokerage markets that purchase
and aggregate data from multiple websites can restore incentives to collect personal data”).
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the form of chronic and forced overtime, and unauthorized outsourcing to
unsafe factories.149
As in the privacy context, the key contracts in supply chains also create
significant negative externalities for third parties. The remainder of this Section
will discuss how the duty affects the internalization of these externalities.
1.

Data Privacy

In Hypothetical 1, a social media app collects information about users and
shares that information with third-party companies, either through direct sales,
partnerships, collaborations, or inadequate safeguards that render that
information vulnerable to hacking and theft. Users can suffer a variety of
privacy, emotional, and financial harms.150 They may also suffer physical harm
as a result of the app’s collection and dissemination of data.151
The collection and dissemination of data may occur pursuant to myriad
contracts. The first set of contracts consists of those the user enters into, such as

149

Anner, supra note 81, at 321 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Solove & Citron, supra note 80, at 756-57 (“Identity-theft victims may face
financial ruin. Identity thieves may plunder victims’ credit, riddling victims’ credit reports
with false information including debts and second mortgages obtained in victims’ names.
Victims struggling with identity theft may be forced to file for bankruptcy, and some may
lose their homes. Victims may be turned down for loans or end up paying higher interest rates
on credit cards. Their utilities may be cut off and their services denied. Victims’ stolen health
information may be used to obtain medical care, saddling them with hefty hospital bills and a
thief’s treatment records. Victims may incur legal fees and have to cover bounced checks.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 759 (“Another component of the data-breach harm
involves a chilling of a person’s ability to engage in life’s important activities. As a result of
a data breach, a person’s increased risk of identity theft might prevent her from buying a new
house. Identity theft, when it occurs, pollutes a person’s credit report, making it difficult if
not impossible to obtain a loan. . . . The same concerns are true for employment. In the face
of a heightened risk of identity theft, a person might delay looking for a new job because a
polluted credit report can interfere with a person’s employment opportunities.”).
151
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243, 1257
(2015) (“Spyware apps allow stalkers and domestic abusers to terrorize victims. Physical
harm is a serious peril when abusers have access to victims’ activities and whereabouts.”);
see also Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 681 (2012) (“The
effects on the victims of cyber sexual harassment include suicide, eating disorders, decreased
motivation to work or study, and a host of psychological problems.”). In December 2021,
Rohingya refugees filed a class action lawsuit against Meta Platforms, formerly Facebook,
“for $150 billion over allegations that the social media company did not take action against
anti-Rohingya hate speech that contributed to violence.” Elizabeth Culliford, Rohingya
Refugees Sue Facebook for $150 Billion over Myanmar Violence, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2021,
2:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/rohingya-refugees-sue-facebook-150billion-over-myanmar-violence-2021-12-07/ (“A [2018] Reuters investigation . . . , cited in
the U.S. complaint, found more than 1,000 examples of posts, comments and images attacking
the Rohingya and other Muslims on Facebook.” (citation omitted)); see Complaint at 67-70,
Doe v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 21-cv-06465 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2021), removed,
No. 4:22-cv-00051 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2022).
150
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terms of service and privacy policies.152 But the social media company can, in
turn, contract with other companies regarding use of the user’s data.153 Certainly,
this presents problems that may be better addressed with robust oversight and
regulation. As a second-best solution, we may also consider how improved
contractual practices may address some of the risks users confront in their daily
lives.
Option 1 requires the social media company to inform app users of the types
of information the app collects and how the company intends to use it. For
example, the FTC brought a complaint against Goldenshores Technologies—
developer of a free flashlight app for Android phones—alleging that the
company “failed to disclose that the app transmitted users’ precise location and
unique device identifier to third parties, including advertising networks.”154 In
its 2013 settlement, the FTC ordered the company to “clearly and prominently”
disclose: “1. That such application collects, transmits, or allows the transmission
of, geolocation information; 2. How geolocation information may be used;
3. Why such application is accessing geolocation information; and 4. The
identity or specific categories of third parties that receive geolocation
information directly or indirectly from such application;”155 and required that
the company “[o]btain[] affirmative express consent from the consumer to the
transmission of such information.”156 But some have warned that “consent to
ongoing and extensive data collection can be neither fully informed nor truly
consensual”157 given the myriad applications of the data—many of which users
may not appreciate given their lack of technological understanding.158
Option 2 requires companies to include certain types of precautions in their
contracts with companies with whom they share app users’ information—for
sale or otherwise. For example, article 28(3) of the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) requires that data processing agreements identify “the
subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the
processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the
obligations and rights of the controller.”159 Article 28(3) further elaborates on
particular stipulations that the contract should include regarding data
processing.160 The European Commission has produced a set of standard
152

See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/business_law/safeselling/terms/ [https://perma.cc/KEC3-PHB9] (last visited Mar. 16, 2022)
(“Sometimes a company’s privacy policy is set forth, or incorporated by reference, in the
terms and conditions. Depending on the factual circumstances, some privacy ‘policies’ are
contracts requiring assent, while other privacy policies are styled as statements of policy.”).
153
See Tufekci, supra note 77.
154
Press Release, FTC, supra note 46.
155
Goldenshores Techs., LLC, 157 F.T.C. 700, 743-44 (2014) (decision and order).
156
Id. at 744.
157
Tufekci, supra note 77.
158
Id.
159
Commission Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 49.
160
Id. at 49-50.
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contract clauses for use by controllers and processers, including clauses
concerning cooperation between processers and controllers in enabling data
subject to exercise their rights under the GDPR,161 security of processing,162 use
of sub-processers,163 and notification of personal data breaches.164
Option 3 prohibits the social media company from disclosing, selling, or
otherwise sharing app users’ information with any third-party company. For
example, the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) gives consumers the
right to “opt out” of the sale of their personal information.165 Consumers can opt
out of the sale by using the CCPA-mandated “Do Not Sell My Personal
Information” link on a business’s website166 and through at least one other
acceptable method chosen by the business.167 But while the CCPA’s consumer
protections are robust, the statute applies only to California residents.168
Legislators in other states have attempted to introduce bills that similarly limit
the sale of consumer data but the results have been mixed. For example, one bill
that the Governor of Hawaii ultimately vetoed169 would have “prohibit[ed] the

161
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/915 of June 4, 2021, 2021 O.J. (L 199)
18, 24.
162
Id. at 22.
163
Id. at 23-24.
164
Id. at 24-25. According to legal commentary, these types of clauses are ones “that a
controller can impose on the processor to satisfy the contractual requirements that the
controller is obliged to impose under Article 28 GDPR.” Mark A. Prinsley, Oliver Yaros,
Björn Vollmuth, Ana Hadnes Bruder & Ondrej Hajda, European Commission Publishes Draft
New Standard Contractual Clauses for International Personal Data Transfers and Article 28
GDPR Clauses Between EU Controllers and Processors, MAYER BROWN (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2020/11/europeancommission-publishes-draft-of-new-standard-contractual-clauses-for-transfers-of-personaldata-to-countries-outside-the-european-union [https://perma.cc/9UpW-54KC]. However,
“[t]he use of the European Commission-approved Article 28 Clauses will not be compulsory
and businesses may continue to use bespoke data processing agreements between controllers
and processors to satisfy the requirements of Article 28 GDPR.” Id. The Commission also
published a set of standard clauses that can be used in contracts involving a controller or
processor’s transfer of personal data to a controller or processor in a third country.
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914 of June 4, 2021, 2021 O.J. (L 199) 31,
37-56.
165
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (West 2021).
166
Id. § 1798.135.
167
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.315(a) (2021) (identifying “a toll-free phone
number, a designated email address, a form submitted in person, a form submitted through
the mail, and user-enabled global privacy controls, such as a browser plug-in or privacy
setting, device setting, or other mechanism, that communicate or signal the consumer’s choice
to opt-out of the sale of their personal information” as acceptable opt-out methods).
168
CIV. § 1798.140(g) (defining “consumer” as “natural person who is a California
resident [within meaning of state tax regulations] . . . however identified, including by any
unique identifier”).
169
EXEC. CHAMBERS, GOV. MSG. NO. 1376, STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS TO HOUSE BILL
NO. 702 (2019) (veto letter from Governor David Y. Ige).
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sale or offering for sale of location data collected using satellite navigation
technology without the explicit consent of the individual who has primary
custody of the satellite navigation technology-equipped device.”170
The contractual duty proposed here is designed to encourage companies to
replicate some of the stakeholder protections discussed above, even in the
absence of a settlement agreement or legislative mandate. Option 1’s disclosure
requirements are consistent with the contractual duty because they would help
social media users assess the risks to themselves before and during use of the
app.171 For example, users may be unaware that an app is collecting information
about their location, biometrics, demographic data, biographical data, shopping
preferences, or political choices when they use the app; they may be even less
aware that the app is then transferring that data to one or more third-party
companies.172 Given the available data on privacy invasions, it is not difficult
for a social media company to reasonably foresee how its collection of personal
data (and subsequent transfer of that data) could lead to the risk of emotional,
financial, and physical harm for its users. That foreseeability of harm could lead
the social media company to include appropriate disclosures in (a) its
agreements with users and (b) its agreements with third-party companies, in
which it would mandate that the latter provide similar disclosures to users.
A similar analysis could lead the social media company to adopt Option 2’s
approach of including particular contractual protections in agreements between
companies relating to the transfer of users’ personal data. For example, if users
are placed at risk because of action or inaction by companies to whom data is
transferred, then it would make sense for the company transferring the data—
here, the social media company—to include provisions in its contract with the
transferee that protect users’ data, including potential restrictions on what the
transferee may do with that data following transfer.
Finally, if it is too difficult to adopt, monitor, and enforce restrictions on uses
of transferred data (pursuant to Option 2), then the proposed contractual duty
170
H.B. 702, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Haw. 2019); see also 2020 Consumer Data Privacy
Legislation,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan.
17,
2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2020consumer-data-privacy-legislation637290470.aspx
[https://perma.cc/72D9-BQQ8]
(highlighting additional state data privacy legislation); 2021 Consumer Data Privacy
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 17, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2021consumer-data-privacy-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/SG69-QNVN] (same).
171
But see Choi et al., supra note 147, at 114 (“[T]he overall effects of such a consentbased approach may be limited in addressing the negative information externalities problem
since well-informed, fully rational consumers may not change their behaviors because optingout may not be individually rational in the presence of information externalities.”).
172
See Danielle Citron, BEWARE: The Dangers of Location Data, FORBES (Dec. 24, 2014,
3:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/12/24/beware-the-dangers-oflocation-data/?sh=45bcf46a43cb (“Companies can sell geolocation data to data brokers,
further filling their dossiers with information about consumers’ medical conditions, religious
affiliations, and more.”).
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could encourage companies to adopt Option 3 and restrict or prohibit the sale of
consumer data to other companies because the sale of such information—like
geolocation data—to third parties could place users at considerable risk of
physical, emotional, and financial harms.173 These risks are also compounded
when the purchasing company turns around and sells that information to yet
another company. The original company may not know the identities of these
downstream purchasers and, therefore, cannot guarantee that the information
would not be put to particular uses. Thus, given this uncertainty, it would be
prudent for a company to adopt prohibitions on disclosure, sale, or unauthorized
access of consumer data. As a contractual matter, this would mean that the
company would (a) categorically avoid certain types of contracts for the sale or
disclosure of information or (b) only enter into such agreements pursuant to
written consent from consumers.
2.

Labor Abuses in Supply Chains

In Hypothetical 2, a brand company contracts with an overseas supplier to
produce clothing at a price so low that the overseas supplier engages in
subcontracting, thereby compromising labor conditions in order to turn a profit.
The proposed duty would require that the brand company revisit supply contract
provisions that create the risk of these harms. Research on supply chains reveals
that contract provisions addressing volume, production schedule, and price can
exacerbate the risks of labor abuses that would threaten the physical security and
well-being of workers in supply chains.174 For example, when a supply contract
requires a high volume in a short delivery window, it increases the likelihood of
subcontracting from the supplier to another party.175 Subcontracting is
dangerous for workers in the supply chain because: (a) supply chain codes of
conduct may not apply to subcontractors,176 (b) subcontracting sites may not be
monitored or audited because the corporation’s representatives may be unaware
of them,177 and (c) suppliers may select subcontractors based solely on their

173
See id. (“Geolocation data is especially revealing about our lives. It is subject to serious
abuse, from domestic abuse and stalking to theft and discrimination.”).
174
Anner, supra note 81, at 321.
175
NIKOLAUS HAMMER, RÉKA PLUGOR, PETER NOLAN & IAN CLARK, UNIV. OF LEICESTER
CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE WORK & EMP. FUTURES, NEW INDUSTRY ON A SKEWED PLAYING FIELD:
SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN UK GARMENT MANUFACTURING 2225 (2015).
176
See Richard M. Locke, Ben A. Rissing & Timea Pal, Complements or Substitutes?
Private Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of Labour Standards in Global Supply
Chains, 51 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELS. 519, 537 (2013); see also Michael E. Blowfield & Catherine
S. Dolan, Stewards of Virtue? The Ethical Dilemma of CSR in African Agriculture, 39 DEV.
& CHANGE 1, 6-7 (2008) (“In practice, the coverage of [supply chain] standards is limited,
condensing the complex social forms found in transnational production into a single model of
the permanent employee, a worker who is increasingly an anomaly in global production.”).
177
See Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights: Looking to Version 2.0 of the ABA
Model Contract Clauses, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519, 1525, 1540-41 (2019).
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ability to meet production demands and not for social compliance quality
reasons.178
If contracting choices create the risk of subcontracting, then the proposed duty
would require that corporations address this risk through contract design. We
can imagine three contract approaches varying in quality and effectiveness.
Option 1 prohibits subcontracting in supply contracts: “Supplier agrees not to
contract with any subcontractors to perform any part of this Agreement.”
However, simply placing the prohibition in the supply contract is no guarantee
that it will be honored. Suppliers have little incentive to abide by this provision
if there is no enforcement risk, and the corporation cannot sanction violations it
cannot detect. Because subcontracting may occur through informal channels, a
corporation may not know that its supplier is using subcontractors or the
conditions of those subcontracting sites.179
Option 2 goes beyond a blanket prohibition and encourages information
flows180 to the corporation regarding the use of subcontracting, such as:
XX. Subcontracting: Supplier agrees as follows:
• Supplier shall submit a list of proposed subcontractors to Buyer by
[insert date] and periodically as appropriate;
• Supplier shall not contract with any subcontractor unless and until it
receives written approval from Buyer;
•

Upon request, Supplier shall provide Buyer with any additional
information Buyer requests in order to evaluate any proposed
subcontractor’s qualifications, including the ability to comply with the
Code of Conduct under this Agreement;
• Supplier and all of its subcontractors agree to permit Buyer, its agents,
representatives, and partners, access to Supplier’s and any
subcontractor’s premises and workers in order to conduct monitoring
and other auditing activities; and
• Supplier agrees to terminate any and all contracts with any approved
subcontractors at Buyer’s request.
While these provisions are better than a blanket prohibition against
subcontracting, they still fall short because they address the symptoms—the
effects of supply contract choices relating to price, delivery, and volume—rather
than the roots of the problem. For example, a supplier faced with high volume
and low prices who cannot subcontract may find other ways to exploit its
workers to meet production demands. A corporation can respond by prohibiting
those methods, but only after the incidents have occurred and the corporation
178

See id. at 1540-41.
See id.
180
See, e.g., U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 135, at 27-28
(recommending that countries structure contracts with foreign investors to ensure government
is able to monitor compliance with operating standards intended to protect human rights).
179

908

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:865

learns of them. A contracting approach that goes after the symptoms will always
be a reactive, not preventive.
To prevent labor violations, Option 3 would require that a corporation
examine what it is asking of suppliers that may lead them to engage in
subcontracting and other practices that may lead to labor abuses. This better
approach requires that corporations reevaluate price, delivery, and volume terms
to set parameters that allow suppliers to perform in a way that is consistent with
desirable labor practices.181 In the pandemic context, some have argued that
companies have failed to consider the impact that decisions to suspend or cancel
orders have on supply chain workers.182 This is an example of the harms-based
approach to stakeholderism that this Article advocates because these scholars
argue that corporations must consider the effects of their contracting choices on
vulnerable third parties who may be injured by these choices.183 They advise that
companies consult with representatives of these workers beforehand—or at least
provide notice—as part of a broader due diligence approach to the supply
chain.184 Similarly, the American Bar Association has developed model supply
contract clauses that identify buyers’ and suppliers’ obligations to prevent and
address human rights violations.185 Critically, the suggested “Buyer Code”
identifies best practices for responsible sourcing, including buyer’s conduct

181
See, e.g., 2018 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 6 (June 21, 2017),
https://bangladesh.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2018-Accord.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3N6N-K2BL] (“In order to induce factories to comply with upgrade and
remediation requirements of the program, participating brands and retailers will negotiate
commercial terms with their suppliers which ensure that it is financially feasible for the
factories to maintain safe workplaces and comply with upgrade and remediation requirements
instituted by the [Chief Safety Inspector].”). The Accord on Fire and Building Safety,
established after the deadly 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse, was replaced by the
International Accord for Health and Safety in the Textile and Garment Industry in fall 2021.
International Accord for Health and Safety in the Textile and Garment Industry (Sept. 1,
2021),
https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/7b3bb7ce-48dc-42c3-8e58-e961b9604003
/downloads/1%20September%20-%20International%20Accord%20on%20Health%20a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5X4A-4VPN]; see Elizabeth Paton, International Brands Sign a New
Accord to Protect Garment Workers in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/25/business/garment-worker-safety-accord.html.
182
VOGT ET AL., supra note 83, at 13.
183
See id. at 16 (“[C]ontracts between brands and suppliers should explicitly acknowledge
supplier factory workers as the intended beneficiaries of the brand’s agreement to pay the
supplier and give workers the right to sue the brand for any wage arrears that may result from
the brand’s failure to do so.”).
184
See id. at 13.
185
WORKING GRP. TO DRAFT MODEL CONT. CLAUSES TO PROTECT HUM. RTS. IN INT’L
SUPPLY CHAINS, AM. BAR ASS’N, BALANCING BUYER AND SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITIES: MODEL
CONTRACT CLAUSES TO PROTECT WORKERS IN INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, VERSION 2.0,
at 19-37; see Contractual Clauses Project, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org
/groups/human_rights/business-human-rights-initiative/contractual-clauses-project/
[https://perma.cc/M7QF-B4UR] (last visited Mar. 16, 2022).
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concerning contract negotiations, performance, renewal, remediation, and
responsible exit.186
Any of these three options would help to reduce the risk of subcontracting,
thereby protecting various stakeholders from risks of abuse in the supply chain.
IV. RECONCILING THE STAKEHOLDERISM DEBATE THROUGH THE
DUTY TO CONTRACT
The duty to contract addresses the concerns of both camps of the recent debate
over stakeholderism by offering an effective means to protect nonshareholder
interests, on the one hand, while avoiding the risk of inauthenticity and
impracticality, on the other.
A harms-based approach protects stakeholders by changing the justification
for protection: protection is warranted not because of the benefits that
stakeholders provide to corporations but because of the risks to which
corporations may subject stakeholders through contract design, negotiation, and
performance. Importantly, this justifies stakeholder protection even when a
benefits approach would not.
As a contractual duty, it also addresses critics’ concerns of inauthenticity and
impracticality. In their study of acquisition deals, Bebchuk, Kastiel, and
Tallarita find that many acquisition agreements lack post-deal stakeholder
protections.187 When parties included such contract terms, they were notably less
effective than the terms protecting those at the bargaining table: “Contractual
provisions designed to protect shareholders and corporate leaders were typically
well specified and effectively enforceable. By contrast, provisions in favor of
stakeholders were underspecified and vague.”188 Finally, “stakeholders’ ability
to enforce them was generally explicitly denied by the acquisition
agreement.”189
Bebchuk, Kastiel, and Tallarita attribute this lack of stakeholder protections
in acquisition deals to the fact that “corporate leaders have incentives not to
protect stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value.”190 The
trouble is that “interests of corporate leaders, while not perfectly aligned with
the interests of shareholders, are robustly linked to them”191 and that
“shareholder legal rights, the structure of director and executive compensation,
and the dynamics of the labor and control markets provide directors and top
186
WORKING GRP. TO DRAFT MODEL CONT. CLAUSES TO PROTECT HUM. RTS. IN INT’L
SUPPLY CHAINS, AM. BAR ASS’N, RESPONSIBLE PURCHASING CODE OF CONDUCT 1-5; see
Contractual Clauses Project, supra note 185 (“While most codes of conduct address the
supplier, the Buyer Code . . . sets out principles and standards for buyers (including brands)
to better protect workers’ human rights in their supply chains.”).
187
Bebchuk et al., supra note 25, at 1515-24.
188
Id. at 1525.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 1471.
191
Id. at 1526.
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executives with incentives to increase shareholder value.”192 Unfortunately,
“there is no significant link between the interests of corporate leaders selling
their companies and the post-sale interests of stakeholders.”193
The proposed duty supplies the missing incentive by mandating that those at
the negotiating table consider the interests of those who are absent.194 This duty
does not simply authorize them to do so—it requires them to do so. It makes
mandatory what was previously only permissive, such as under state
constituency statutes that merely authorize directors to consider stakeholder
interests in decision-making.195 This duty is what aligns the interests of corporate
leaders with those of stakeholders. In its absence, we are unlikely to witness a
meaningful change in contracting practices by corporate leaders, as
demonstrated by the study above.196 And without those changed practices,
corporate leaders will continue to injure stakeholders through their contracting
choices. The incentive is key to reversing these practices.197
By requiring corporations to translate stakeholderism into contract clauses,
this duty facilitates comparison of companies’ commitments to stakeholderism.
It is these clauses that allow society to observe whether corporate leaders are
making good on their proclamations in favor of stakeholders. Not all clauses are
equal. The specificity, scope, and enforceability of negotiated contract clauses
can help to distinguish those corporations making good on stakeholderism from
those that just talk the talk. These comparisons are important if the public
actually rewards companies that are more stakeholder friendly, because the duty
makes it costlier for companies that do not care about stakeholders to imitate
those that do. That is, the duty to contract allows for some level of observability
and verifiability of corporate commitments to stakeholderism that can be
compared and measured across companies.198 The resulting market
differentiation can offer its own incentive to include increasingly better
stakeholder protections in contracts. While initially incentivized by a legal duty,

192

Id.; see also Fisch & Solomon, supra note 19, at 1335 (“[S]hareholders ultimately
control corporate decisions through their voting power and the capital market discipline.”).
193
Bebchuk et al., supra note 25, at 1526.
194
See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 19, at 1335 (“[U]nless corporate officials are
compelled to consider and even to prioritize nonshareholder interests, we are skeptical that
they will do so.”).
195
Bebchuk et al., supra note 25, at 1490 (“[A]s of October 1, 2010, all constituency
statutes in force are merely permissive.”).
196
See id. at 1524-27.
197
See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 19, at 1335 (discussing potential reforms to better
align interests of corporate officials with stakeholders, such as governance structure and
executive compensation changes and contractual constraints).
198
See Eldar, supra note 29, at 994-95 (proposing new legal form that can serve as
commitment device that distinguishes it in marketplace and, consequently, can help attract
capital); Martinez & Fletcher, supra note 29, at 903 (explaining that “equality metrics” can
help differentiate corporations truly committed to racial diversity from those whose actions
are purely performative).
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we may hope that the outcome—contract clauses—can trigger a race to the
top.199
This duty also addresses the trade-offs that can render stakeholderism
impractical. Corporate leaders may become overwhelmed by the prospect of
identifying who they should protect, how they should do so, and what they
should do when protection for one stakeholder detracts from benefits to another.
But, under this duty, corporate leaders do not need to fret over what they should
be doing because the duty provides that answer: contracting. Certainly, this duty
does not eliminate the trade-off problem: contractual protections for some
stakeholders can create undesirable impacts for others.200 But it supplies a
limiting principle that makes stakeholderism more effective in practice.
Corporate leaders are not charged with accounting for the interests of all
potential stakeholders who may be affected by their contract; rather, they are
responsible for considering the interests of those who may be harmed by
performance of the contract as designed.201
V.

OBJECTIONS

The normative and practical solutions proposed in this Article raise two
potential objections addressed below. Section V.A discusses the risk that the
199

For example, in October 2021, Merck and the Medicines Patent Pool (“MPP”)
announced “the signing of a voluntary licencing agreement to facilitate affordable global
access for molnupiravir, an investigational oral COVID-19 antiviral medicine” to “help create
broad access for molnupiravir use in 105 low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
following appropriate regulatory approvals.” Press Release, Meds. Patent Pool, The
Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) and MSD Enter into Licence Agreement for Molnupiravir, an
Investigational Oral Antiviral COVID-19 Medicine, to Increase Broad Access in Low- and
Middle- Income Countries (Oct. 27, 2021), https://medicinespatentpool.org/newspublications-post/mpp-msd-new-licence-announcement-molnupiravir
[https://perma.cc/MN27-L52N]. The license agreement is publicly available without
redactions.
Molnupiravir
(MOL),
MEDS.
PATENT
POOL,
https://medicinespatentpool.org/licence-post/molnupiravir-mol
[https://perma.cc/G7H5X5JX] (last visited Mar. 16, 2022). Investor groups hoped that the “precedent-setting event”
would “pressure other pharmaceutical companies with COVID-19 entries in late-stage trials
such as Pfizer and Roche to follow suit and enter into negotiations with the MPP, and for peer
companies to consider joining similar license-sharing programs such as the [World Health
Organization’s] mRNA technology hub.” Press Release, Interfaith Ctr. on Corp. Resp.,
Shareholders Welcome Merck’s Decision to Share IP for Covid-19 Anti-viral Drug (Oct. 28,
2021), https://www.iccr.org/shareholders-welcome-mercks-decision-share-ip-covid-19-antiviral-drug [https://perma.cc/P8FG-XAF2] (quoting Sister Judy Byron of the Northwest
Coalition for Responsible Investment: “Merck has become a first-mover with molnupiravir
for COVID-19 and we will be letting its peers know of our expectation that they will soon be
following in Merck’s footsteps”).
200
Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“In certain situations, if the actor takes steps to reduce one set of
injury risks, this would involve the burden or disadvantage of creating a different set of injury
risks, and these other risks are included within the burden of precautions.”).
201
See supra Section III.A (basing duty to contract on harm prevention).
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proposed duty overestimates the potential for contract design to address
stakeholder harms. Section V.B explores the related concern that regulation may
offer a better approach to stakeholder protection.
A.

Limits of Contract Design

The first potential objection is that the duty to contract overestimates what
contract design can accomplish. This concern is partially motivated by the
realization that contracts are imperfect at eliminating risks—even for those
negotiating and drafting the agreements.202 Contract design will inevitably fail
because of information costs and trade-offs. Parties encounter information costs
when they negotiate, draft, and sign contracts: “[T]he parties might not foresee
all possible contingencies or they would have to incur prohibitively high
negotiation and drafting costs to partition all contingencies sufficiently to
provide for efficient obligations in each case.”203 Information costs impede both
ex ante contract design and ex post contract enforcement204 and contribute to the
incompleteness of most contracts:
[T]he parties to a relationship will not write a contract that anticipates all
the events that may occur and the various actions that are appropriate in
these events. Rather they will write a contract that is incomplete, in the
sense that it contains gaps or missing provisions; that is, the contract will
specify some actions the parties must take but not others; it will mention
what should happen in some states of the world, but not in others. A result
of this incompleteness is that events will occur which make it desirable for
the parties to act differently from the way specified in the contract.205
For example, some contracting parties do not include a force majeure clause
in their contracts. A force majeure clause “defines an area of events that might
excuse nonperformance within the contract period.”206 The absence of this
clause presented a problem when the COVID-19 pandemic impeded the ability
of many contracting parties to perform as expected.207 This oversight can be
partially explained by an informational challenge: prior to the pandemic,
contracting parties likely did not anticipate that they would be unable to perform

202

See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of
Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 187, 190 (2005).
203
Id. at 191.
204
Id. at 190.
205
Hart, supra note 93, at 123.
206
Travis S. Hunter & Renée Mosley Delcollo, Is the Force Majeure with You?, AM. BAR
ASS’N (July 6, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees
/commercial-business/articles/2020/is-the-force-majeure-with-you-coronavirus-contracts/
[https://perma.cc/69BZ-GYAK].
207
See Paula M. Bagger, The Importance of Force Majeure Clauses in the COVID-19 Era,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees
/commercial-business/boilerplate-contracts/force-majeure-clauses-contracts-covid-19/.
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because of a pandemic or related government orders.208 The nature and extent of
the state of emergency declarations, stay-at-home orders, travel restrictions,
nonessential business closures, and lockdowns have been described as
unprecedented. Contracting parties frequently anticipate risks based on the
past—things that have gone wrong before. It may therefore have proven difficult
for them to anticipate and plan for these “unprecedented” events, which may
explain why many of them did not.
Even those parties who did include a force majeure clause may have neglected
to include the necessary language to trigger the clause, such as “pandemic” or
“government shutdown orders.”209 The absence of these key words may prevent
the application of the clause, which depends on contract interpretation of the
words that the parties chose.210 The result is that “very few contracting parties
will be able to point to a specific term in their Force Majeure clause that covers
the present situation.”211
The second concern relates to trade-offs. Even if contracting parties have
information, they need to agree on what to do based on that information. For
example, legal counsel now advise clients to include contract provisions that
address the COVID-19 pandemic and, possibly, as default language going
forward.212 But such a provision does not protect all parties equally. In a retail
lease, for example, a tenant may prefer a force majeure clause that would
suspend its obligation to pay upon the onset of a pandemic; for that reason, the
landlord may not prefer such a clause. Depending on the nature of the
government order, the landlord may still be able to perform—and may prefer to
208
However, some commentators have pointed out that pandemics have occurred before—
and may occur again—such that the risks were not completely unknown to the parties. See
Andrew A. Schwartz, Contracts and COVID-19, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 48 (2020).
209
See Jamie Furia & Justin Corbalis, Mounting a Successful COVID-19 Force Majeure
Argument,
LAW360
(Sept.
25,
2020,
4:00
PM),
https://www.law360.com/commercialcontracts/articles/1312711 (“[A]ny party seeking to
excuse its contractual obligations based on a force majeure event must carefully connect the
dots between the cause — whether a government order or the effects of the pandemic — and
the frustration of the specific conduct sought to be relieved.”); Schwartz, supra note 208, at
56-67 (identifying over two thousand cases involving force majeure clauses but none
involving word “pandemic” and only seventy-four involving “epidemic”); Daniel Sharma,
Coronavirus: The Second Wave and Force Majeure, DLA PIPER (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/germany/insights/publications/2020/12/covid-19-the-secondwave-and-force-majeure/
[https://perma.cc/F6X9-KJVK]
(distinguishing
between
“epidemic” and “pandemic” for triggering application of force majeure clause).
210
See Sharma, supra note 209 (“Whether a force majeure clause is applicable in a
particular case, and what its consequences would be, depends primarily on the wording of the
clause. Courts have held that force majeure clauses are to be interpreted in a narrow sense and
that performance under a contract is ordinarily excused only if the event preventing
performance is explicitly mentioned in the force majeure clause.”).
211
Schwartz, supra note 208, at 57.
212
See, e.g., id. at 58 (“Now that the risk of pandemics has become salient, we are certain
to see parties add terms like ‘epidemic’ and ‘pandemic’ to Force Majeure clauses in future
contracts, as many commentators are now recommending.”).

914

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:865

do so—while the tenant no longer finds its contract desirable or its obligation
feasible. The question is: Who gets stuck with the cost of a rental property that
is, at least temporarily, invaluable: tenant or landlord? A force majeure clause
that addresses the pandemic can shift the cost from tenant to landlord, but the
landlord may negotiate for something in exchange for such cost shifting.213 This
is the trade-off challenge: risk management tools are going to lead to different
distributional outcomes for the two parties. In order to reach agreement despite
these different preferences, contract parties trade various “carrots and sticks”
pertaining to the clause or agreement.
Both of these concerns can compromise the implementation of the “duty to
contract” proposed in this Article. Corporate leaders may argue that they
encounter even greater information costs when designing contracts to protect
stakeholders. They may claim ignorance as to how a contractual obligation may
impact stakeholders who they cannot identify ex ante. They may similarly claim
ignorance as to how to address this information deficit; the optimal strategy
remains unknown ex ante and, consequently, is difficult to prescribe through
explicit contractual obligations. There is also a trade-off problem because there
is no one at the bargaining table to trade something in exchange for contractual
protections for stakeholders. In the landlord example above, the tenant may
agree to pay a higher rent or a larger deposit in order to include a force majeure
clause that would protect it in the event of a pandemic. In the stakeholder
example, neither contracting party may benefit from including stakeholder
protections. It is not in their interest to do so—instead, it may impose costs—
and there is no one at the bargaining table to “trade” them a corresponding
benefit for providing such contractual protection.
There are three responses to these concerns. First, information costs are
manageable because these contracts are not novel. Corporations have previously
entered into data-sharing agreements, lease agreements, supply agreements,
acquisition agreements, arbitration agreements, employment agreements, and
many others—all of which have documented risks to stakeholders. Management
is also under increasing pressure to remain informed about various risks to the
corporation created by its own conduct. For example, the United Nations
Guiding Principles require that companies engage in human rights due diligence
which “should include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts,
integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating
how impacts are addressed.”214 A number of countries around the world have
213
See, e.g., id. at 59 (“Contract negotiations are dynamic, and your counterparties will
respond if you seek to include ‘pandemic’ to [sic] the Force Majeure clauses contained in
future contracts. All else being equal, they will offer a lower price, because you are foisting
the risk of nonperformance on to them.”); Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko & Eric Talley,
Contractual Evolution, 89 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 17-18)
(explaining that, in exchange for pandemic carve-out in material adverse effect clause,
“counsel for the buyer would likely be unwilling to accept a pandemic carve-out without
extracting a buyer-friendly provision as a quid pro quo”).
214
U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Rep. on the Guiding Principles on
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implemented—or are considering—laws that would require covered companies
to engage in such human rights due diligence.215 A number of corporate scholars
have also argued that assessing risk of stakeholder harms is part of fiduciary
duties.216 Therefore, corporate managers cannot claim ignorance of risks that
they impose on stakeholders. Instead, they must gather this information under
many circumstances, which, in turn, will lower the information costs associated
with implementing this duty.
The trade-off concern is similarly unpersuasive. The incentive for
stakeholder protection is provided by a legal duty as opposed to bargained-for
benefits. The fact that contracting parties have little incentive to consider—let
alone negotiate around—third-party interests only supports the need for a legal
duty that applies to those at the bargaining table. Incentives are not static; they
can be altered through new “carrots” and “sticks.” And when there are limited
carrots available at the bargaining table to incentivize stakeholder protection,
this legal duty provides a stick. Hence, the need for a legal duty; the duty supplies
the incentive that is otherwise absent at the negotiating table. Even if
stakeholders are not present to offer corporations benefits in exchange for
protection, the legal duty is present to threaten sanctions if corporations fail to
consider this protection themselves.
The final response is that contracting parties already encounter these
challenges in the contracting process and find strategies to manage them so as
not to preclude agreement. They can also employ those strategies with respect
to stakeholder protection. For example, contracting parties resort to the use of
relational norms, judicial interpretation, and strategic ambiguous language to
introduce sufficient flexibility to respond to contingencies post contract
formation.217 Interfirm collaborations often raise similar concerns when “[t]he
precise goal and manner of achieving it only become clear in the course of the
Business and Human Rights, at 17, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011).
215
See Mandatory Due Diligence, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/big-issues/mandatory-due-diligence/ [https://perma.cc/VM3V-HRZV]
(last visited Mar. 16, 2022).
216
See, e.g., Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 28, at 1459 (“[C]ourts should recognize ESG
as an essential part of boards’ monitoring mission.”); David Millon, Human Rights and
Delaware Corporate Law, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 173, 182-86 (2012)
(discussing potential legal and reputational risk associated with human rights violations
abroad and risk management responsibility of boards of directors).
217
See, e.g., Al-Najjar, supra note 106, at 435 (discussing roles of ambiguous language,
“reputation, conventions, property rights over physical assets, or the legal system” in
introducing flexibility); Hadfield, supra note 98, at 957 (“A rational decisionmaker, aware of
the problems of control and opportunism, simply would not enter into a contract so incomplete
if it represented the entirety of expected obligations and commitments. Instead, I argue,
franchisee and franchisor enter into a ‘franchise relationship’ in reliance on commonly
understood features of that relationship which fill in the gaps of the written contract and create
an understanding of the full range of commitments involved.”); Scott & Triantis, supra note
202, at 197 (discussing use of broad standards to shift costs to judicial interpretation, which
has informational advantage of post-contract-formation reality).
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parties’ collaboration.”218 The solution is that many contracting parties
incorporate an “information regime [that] allows for the joint interpretation of
ambiguity, and makes observable to the parties those actions that would be
opaque in an unstructured, informal exchange. This heightened, mutual
observability allows the parties to learn about their respective capabilities as well
as their disposition to cooperate.”219 Many parties, such as those operating in
innovative industries, also specify formal governance and decision-making
procedures in the contract that would allow the parties to respond to new
information in a manner that preserves their collaboration, including processes
for dispute resolution.220 Similarly, franchise contracts “do[] not specify the
details of the many transactions that will take place within the framework of the
basic exchange.”221 Instead of “spelling out every decision ex ante, [a franchise
contract] designs a decisionmaking structure and assigns to the franchisor
responsibility for responding to market conditions as they arise and to the
franchisee responsibility for compliance.”222
Contracting parties can use similar strategies to protect stakeholder interests
even when they do not have access to all the information that may be useful in
crafting such protection. In fact, parties could use contract design as a means of
augmenting the information they claim not to possess. The stakeholder impact
assessments discussed in Part III can help to identify: (a) stakeholders who may
be negatively impacted by one or more contractual obligations, including
identifying the obligation; (b) the nature of the impact; and (c) the extent or
gravity of the impact, including its duration.223 If this practice were regularized,

218

Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1377, 1385 (2010); id. at 1391 (“Formal enforcement can break down, however, where the
optimal actions for each party depend on the future state that materializes. Uncertainty about
the future makes specifying most future states—let alone the appropriate action that is to be
taken if they occur—prohibitively costly or impossible.”).
219
Id. at 1403.
220
Id.
221
Hadfield, supra note 98, at 946.
222
Id. at 948.
223
At least one recent proposal sought to mandate information about ranked risk
assessments. The Corporate Human Rights Risk Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation Act
of 2019 sought to require issuers of securities to provide a human rights disclosure that would
identify human rights risks and impacts “that are known or should be known,” and rank the
identified risks and impacts based on severity. Corporate Human Rights Risk Assessment,
Prevention, and Mitigation Act of 2019, 116th Cong. § 3 (discussion draft July 2, 2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-116pih-corphuman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9JB-JAAG]. The proposal also clarified that issuers’ rankings should
account for the gravity and extent of the risks and harms as well as any challenges of
remedying potential harms. Id. This proposal was not formally filed during the 116th
Congress and, so far, has not been introduced during the current legislative session. However,
the House of Representatives passed legislation in June 2021 that would require the SEC to
“conduct a study about the value to investors of . . . information about the human rights
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it would encourage contracting parties to fully assess the impact of their bilateral
relations on those not at the bargaining table. This step reduces the information
deficit because each party may be aware of stakeholder impacts that the other is
not. For example, in a cross-border deal, each party may be better able to assess
the stakeholder impacts in its own jurisdiction. This step of the negotiation
process would encourage the parties to share information of which they are
aware. This information-sharing stage could also encourage parties to consult
with potential stakeholders to complete the impact assessment. As such, this step
would not only encourage contracting parties to exchange information with each
other but would also incentivize them to gather information not in their
possession.
The information-sharing stage assists both stakeholders and contracting
parties. It assists stakeholders because it encourages contracting parties to
consider the full extent of the costs of the exchange—including potential
negative externalities. It also creates an opportunity for stakeholders to play a
role in early contract negotiations by informing contracting parties about
stakeholder impacts. This stage is in the interest of the parties because it
encourages each party to share information that is in their possession about
potential long-term risks. If this information is kept private, the party in
possession of it can independently manage its consequences or even bargain
around it without the counterparty’s knowledge. Should the risk come to
fruition, the better-informed party may be in a better position to cope with the
consequences than the blindsided party. A stakeholder impact assessment can
force the better-informed party to reveal information that is otherwise private,
which can help both parties plan accordingly.224 It can also help contracting
parties to focus on issues that they may otherwise marginalize during contract
negotiations, only for those issues to arise post contract formation. As such, it
enables better contract planning at the initial stage.

commitments of issuers . . . including information about any principles used to evaluate risk,
constituency consultation process, and supplier due diligence.” Corporate Governance
Improvement and Investor Protection Act, H.R. 1187, 117th Cong. § 605 (as passed by House
of Representatives, June 16, 2021).
224
For example, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner explain that one source of contract
incompleteness is strategic: “One party might strategically withhold information that would
increase the total gains from contracting (the ‘size of the pie’) in order to increase her private
share of the gains from contracting (her ‘share of the pie’).” Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87, 94 (1989). They argue that “[b]y changing the default rules of the game, lawmakers can
importantly reduce the opportunities for this rent-seeking, strategic behavior” especially by
including “penalty defaults that induce knowledgeable parties to reveal information by
contracting around the default penalty.” Id.
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Why Not Regulate?

A second important objection is that the best way to protect stakeholders is
through regulation and not contract design.225 Many may prefer public
regulation because it can also account for the negative effects of contracts on
third parties and mandate that parties take certain precautions, limit their
activities within prescribed parameters, or provide warnings to at-risk third
parties. Public regulation may also provide a variety of enforcement mechanisms
to ensure that contracting parties adhere to these limitations.
Regulation proponents may therefore worry that the focus on stakeholderism
detracts from the prospect of such regulation and builds up hope in corporate
self-regulation or other alternatives.226 This Article is not intended to detract
from regulatory efforts. But there are a number of difficulties with this faith in
public law, including information asymmetries, distributional concerns, and
extraterritorial effects. The first challenge deals with the comparative
knowledge of the regulated versus the regulators regarding the underlying
problem that gives rise to the need for regulation.227 In the stakeholder context,

225
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 11, at 95 (“Those who are deeply concerned
about how corporations affect stakeholders . . . should support efforts to ensure that
capitalism works well for all corporate stakeholders. In our view, the most effective way to
do so is by adopting laws, regulations and government policies . . . aimed at protecting
stakeholder groups.”).
226
See, e.g., id. at 164 (criticizing stakeholderism for asking stakeholders to rely on “wellmeaning corporate leaders using their discretion to incorporate stakeholder interests into their
objectives”).
227
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86, 87 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012) (arguing that
“regulators necessarily operate under considerable uncertainty and at a lag behind private
actors” as “financial firms operate in a dynamic environment in which there are many
unknowns and unknowables and state-of-the-art knowledge quickly obsolesces”). For
example, in order to perform antitrust review of tech giants, the head of the Justice
Department’s antitrust division “assigned four attorneys and two staff economists to train in
artificial intelligence and machine learning to better understand the work that technology
companies do.” Rob Copeland, Breakup of Tech Giants ‘on the Table,’ U.S. Antitrust Chief
Says, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/breakup-of-techgiants-on-the-table-u-s-antitrustchief-says-11571765689. Even attempts to increase
information flows can lead to the risk of regulatory capture, as Wendy Wagner discusses:
In administrative law, the absence of limits on the quality, quantity, or content of
information submitted to the agency makes the temptation to inundate the agency with
reams of technical details and multiple arguments all but irresistible. Indeed, a variety of
doctrinal and statutory incentives unwittingly encourage regulatory participants to load
the administrative system with more and more information in ways that ultimately
undermine pluralistic oversight by creating unfair advantages for those advocates who
have the resources to engage in these excessive processes.
Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1321, 1328 (2010); see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Against Regulatory Displacement: An
Institutional Analysis of Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 673, 688-91 (2015) (reviewing
critiques of “regulatory capture” and concluding that “capture presents a serious problem in
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corporate actors are frequently better informed than regulators about how their
contemplated and current operations endanger stakeholders.228 Risks only
become common knowledge once they materialize into actual harm to a
stakeholder, and at that point, we all know—including regulators. This
information asymmetry complicates regulatory design that seeks to prevent the
harm before it arises. Corporate actors are not only better informed about risks;
they may also be better informed about the strategies needed to manage those
risks.
The problems associated with regulatory solutions to stakeholder protection
are further demonstrated by distributional and extraterritorial concerns. The
distributional concern explains the frequent lack of political will to do
something: elected officials are reluctant to champion legislative solutions when
the costs are borne by their constituency but the direct benefits of the legislation
pass to those outside the constituency. These are the distributional effects of
legislation. Lawmaking is costly—informationally, financially, and politically.
As discussed above, regulation is dependent on information, and it can prove
costly—including financially—to gather, analyze, and use that information to
inform legislation. Due to these costs, legislation may prove politically costly
because it uses up a variety of resources that could be devoted to other issues.
These limitations are further compounded when the beneficiaries are unknown,
few, or abroad.229 For example, the direct beneficiaries of supply chain
legislation may be foreign workers in supply chains overseas or other vulnerable
communities, rather than Americans.230 Therefore, a legislative approach in the
United States would commit valuable resources to the production of laws that
would primarily benefit those who are not part of the body politic.

the regulation of financial services”).
228
Cf. Lipson, supra note 227, at 690 (explaining information asymmetry between
financial regulators and private-sector risk managers as source of regulatory capture).
229
See, e.g., Johnston et al., supra note 142, at 41 (“First, the law may be irrelevant in
situations where corporations produce externalities across borders, and outside the reach of
(national) regulation. Second, it may be difficult for the regulator to identify social costs
before they occur.”); id. (“[Third, a]s production processes become more complex and supply
chains become longer, regulation has to abandon general principles applicable to entire
industries or the economy as a whole in favour of an approach, which differentiates between
individual firms, and even individual activities. This third aspect of the trilemma greatly
increases regulatory costs.”).
230
E.g., Corporate Human Rights Risk Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation Act of
2019,
116th
Cong.
§2
(discussion
draft
July
2,
2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-116pih-corphuman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9JB-JAAG] (“The human rights policies, practices, and impacts of
publically [sic] traded companies in the United States are material to investors and the broader
public interest in the short-term and long-term and should be disclosed to investors and the
general public annually to help inform investment decision-making and support the public
interest in ensuring publically [sic] traded companies in the United States do not cause or
contribute to adverse human rights impacts in the United States or in other countries.”).
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This is a variant of the interest-leverage divergence problem discussed in
Section I.C. Its earlier invocation explained the failure of private (or market)
regulation of corporate misconduct: those with leverage over corporations (such
as investors or consumers) do not have sufficient interest in sanctioning
corporations for wrongful conduct because they are not the ones who bear the
harms from that conduct.231 As a result, market incentives frequently fail to curb
corporate misconduct.232 But this problem also arises in public regulation: those
who bear the costs of public regulation (and therefore help to determine the
demand for it) may not be the direct beneficiaries of the resulting laws. Even if
legislators enacted such a law, they need to confront the issue of extraterritorial
application of these laws to conduct in other countries. Such concerns ultimately
proved fatal to attempts to hold companies liable for human rights abuses abroad
through the Alien Tort Statute.233 The combination of these additional factors
may help to explain why we don’t see more robust legislation protecting
stakeholder groups in the supply chain or otherwise.
As illustrated below in Figure 2, contract design may address many of these
challenges and facilitate—not impede—subsequent regulatory solutions through
a progression of regulatory phases governed by different institutions. The
remainder of this Section describes one approach in which contract design
facilitates regulation. The first phase is “mandated experimentalism,” in which
courts enforce a duty to contract that requires corporate actors to engage in
experimentation regarding the optimal solutions for addressing, mitigating, and
eliminating risks to stakeholders. This is “mandated” because it is a recognized
duty. It is “experimentalist” because the standard of care is only satisfied by
reasonable contract design in light of contracting parties’ knowledge.

231
See supra Section I.C (explaining lack of interest convergence between shareholders
and stakeholders).
232
Cf. Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 11, at 119 (advocating for external regulation to
address negative “environmental impact of a company’s operations”).
233
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013).
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Figure 2. Example of Progressive Regulation Aided by Contract Design.

For example, imagine that Buyer and Supplier include in their contract a
standard model clause that provides for monitoring and inspection rights of
Buyer regarding Supplier’s factories overseas.234 Several months later, Buyer
learns that Supplier is committing forced labor violations in its supply chain. An
internal audit by Buyer reveals that Buyer’s auditing practices, announced to
Supplier prior to the visit, contributed to the forced labor violations by providing
Supplier with several opportunities to hide its violations. Buyer now terminates
its contract with Supplier and enters into a contract with a second supplier,
Supplier 2. In its contract with Supplier 2, Buyer cannot satisfy the legal
standard by using the same contract provisions it used in its previous contract
with Supplier. It now knows that announced audits do not work; therefore, it
must use its increased knowledge to design more effective clauses in its new
contract with Supplier 2.
By mandating this experimentation, courts force corporate actors to
accumulate knowledge about risks, impacts, causes, solutions, and the
effectiveness of those solutions. Of course, that information does not help the
regulatory process if it is known only to contracting parties. The second phase
is thus concerned with information disclosure. Here, corporate actors are
required to disclose information to the public (including legislators) about their
attempted contractual design approaches and the effectiveness of those
approaches.235 As such, the combination of phase one (mandated
234

See supra Section III.B.2 (providing example of contract language that would
encourage information flows between corporations and suppliers, including through
inspection rights).
235
See U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 135, at 33
(“Appropriate disclosure of the contract terms allows both parties to communicate
transparently with those who will be affected by the project in an effort to reduce suspicion
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experimentalism) and phase two (information disclosure) results in important
information subsidies to legislators regarding the desired legislation.236 By
mandating disclosure, legislators do not need to speculate on what may work to
protect stakeholders, nor do they need to invest time and resources to gather that
information. Corporate actors have already gathered and tested various solutions
through the first phase of mandated experimentalism. Legislators benefit from
this knowledge when they mandate that corporations share what they have found
through information disclosure.237
These two preliminary phases can facilitate a third phase of regulation
(substantive regulation) when government actors benefit from the information
that has been gathered and shared.238 These information subsidies help to address
some of the earlier concerns with regulatory solutions. The easiest benefit is that
it helps address information asymmetries between the regulated and the
regulator by forcing the former to share that information. But it improves the
information sharing by also forcing corporate actors to gather information that
they otherwise may not. In this way, the mandated experimentalism phase
involves burden-shifting from the regulators to the regulated concerning the
accumulation of knowledge needed to support meaningful regulation.
Regulatory information subsidies not only mitigate the first regulatory
challenge—information asymmetries—but also the distributional challenge. By
reducing information costs of regulation, information subsidies also help lower
costs the constituency needs to bear to produce that regulation. By narrowing
the gap between ex ante costs and ex post benefits, information subsidies

regarding the fairness of the contract terms and guard against unrealistic expectations. Thus,
disclosure should be viewed as one part of any community engagement plan. Disclosure of
the contract also promotes accountability of both parties to implement the promises agreed in
the contract and notifies third parties of the rights and obligations of the parties to the
contract.” (citation omitted)). Some countries have adopted or proposed supply chain
legislation that seeks information disclosure of both risks and effectiveness of corporate actors
in addressing those risks. See, e.g., Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(5)(d)-(e) (UK)
(recommending disclosure of “the parts of its business and supply chains where there is a risk
of slavery and human trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and manage
that risk” and “its effectiveness in ensuring that slavery and human trafficking is not taking
place in its business or supply chains, measured against such performance indicators as it
considers appropriate”); Corporate Human Rights Risk Assessment, Prevention, and
Mitigation Act of 2019 § 3(s)(2)(F) (“[F]or any action taken, the assessment of the issuer of
the efficacy of the action and a description of any outcomes of such action . . . .”).
236
See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (discussing benefits of “directly deliberative
polyarchy” and “information pooling”).
237
See Martinez & Fletcher, supra note 29, at 899-900 (recommending that companies
disclose strategies employed to meet diversity targets to help evaluate effectiveness of various
strategies and allow companies to learn from one another’s experiences).
238
See Romano, supra note 227, at 104 (arguing in favor of financial regulatory
mechanisms that encourage both regulatory experimentation and information sharing
regarding effectiveness of that experimentation).
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increase the acceptability of a particular regulation because, all other things
equal, it will not cost as much to produce.
In this example, different institutions work together to increase the likelihood
of the outcome some stakeholder advocates prefer: substantive regulations
prescribing desired corporate conduct. But the road to that outcome is paved by
the efforts of other institutions. The first phase is overseen by the courts and
created by a “duty to contract”; this phase would not occur but for the role of the
courts. This phase is also furnished by private contracting that introduces the
experimentalist dimension. Critically, this contracting element establishes the
foundation of information that will be passed through to regulators in the
subsequent phases. Here, corporate actors, through their various contractual
arrangements, will collect information about stakeholder risks, impacts, causes,
solutions, and effectiveness. This information is then shared publicly through
government-mandated information disclosure, and the disclosed information
subsidizes the costs associated with reaching the final phase of substantive
regulation, which will likely be undertaken by the legislature. As such, private
contracting is not a substitute or competitor to public regulation; instead, it can
serve as an important predicate condition that can increase the likelihood of
reaching substantive regulation.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes “contractual stakeholderism” to address both the needs
of stakeholderism advocates, and the challenges raised by stakeholderism critics
regarding the risk that stakeholderism is either inauthentic or impractical. It is
not a perfect solution. Contracts are limited, trade-offs are unavoidable, and
managerial agency costs remain. But this approach offers a way to meaningfully
implement stakeholderism so that it will have real-life consequences for all those
individuals who are routinely harmed by corporations’ contractual choices. And
that is a lot of people. By translating stakeholderism into actual contractual
commitments—and not just empty rhetoric—this approach allows us to identify
those companies that mean what they say when it comes to the welfare of their
employees, customers, and communities. The contract is the proof of their
commitment.
Aside from its practical consequences, this approach also reframes the
reasons for protecting stakeholders. The basis for stakeholder protection matters
because it can determine the quality and extent of that protection and at what
cost. A business case can get us only so far. At some point, stakeholder
protection will clash with business interest, but that conflict should not always
end with stakeholders losing. Instead, it is important to shift stakeholder
protection away from corporate or societal receipt of benefits and towards
prevention of stakeholder harms. When corporations act in the world, it is only
reasonable that we hold them accountable for the harms they cause. When these
harms originate in the contracts they design and perform, it is equally reasonable
to expect that a corporation’s leaders will exercise their abilities to prevent those
harms from arising in the first place.

